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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on the European Union’s development partnerships, and 
particularly on the differentiated approach to development which was introduced 
as an operational principle in the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020. 
According to this approach, development funding should be targeted where it is 
needed most and where it can have the most impact. The differentiated approach to 
development, also known as the differentiation principle, initially affected nineteen 
Middle Income Countries (MICs) mainly in Latin America and Asia. In accordance 
with the principle, development cooperation was to be ended in the countries 
concerned when the MFF 2014-2020 came into force.
Adopting the differentiation principle as a policy decision is a significant one. It 
connects to the global debates on poverty in the MICs in particular which 1) may 
not have solid enough economic development to maintain their MIC status, and 2) 
may still struggle with development challenges such as in-country poverty pockets, 
deep economic and social inequality between their citizens, and environmental and 
political fragility. By introducing the differentiation principle, the EU has argued 
that the countries that have crossed the MIC threshold should take responsibility 
for dealing with their internal challenges when they have the prosperity to do so. As 
such, the principle raises for example questions such as whose responsibility poverty 
eradication is (and by what means) in the light of the Sustainable Development Goals 
and in today’s global and inter-connected world. In addition, changing partnerships 
entail a shift from the old to something new, and considering “then what and on 
whose terms” is central to the analysis. 
By asking whether the EU’s differentiated approach is compatible and coherent 
with the EU’s development policy objective of poverty eradication, and what 
alternative approaches to development cooperation the EU proposes in order to 
achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, the study at hand analyses the legitimacy 
of the principle as it was applied to the MFF 2014-2020. To that end, the notion of 
Policy Coherence for Development is being scrutinized from the point of view of 
differentiation in development. Likewise global taxation, a major policy agenda for 
the EU, is looked at as an alternative for more equal revenue re-distribution.
The analysis points to very ambiguous results, concluding that the EU, a stern 
promoter of values such as human rights, equality and equity, seemed not to have 
a clear strategy in applying differentiation when it became an operational principle 
in 2014. It did not have sound exit strategies that have been negotiated with the 
partners; neither did it seem to have clear visions of future partnerships when the 
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differentiation principle came into force. Rather, the initial decisions seemed to 
be based on motives driven by the EU’s own interests, and only afterwards, most 
notably when the Sustainable Development Goals became the global sustainability 
agenda, did the EU start to pay more attention to inequality, particularly in MICs, as 
a development challenge. In any event, with its current financial architecture, the EU 
is ill-prepared to deal with complex development issues such as economic and social 











Käsillä oleva väitöskirja tarkastelee Euroopan unionin kehitysyhteistyössä sovellet-
tavaa eriyttämisperiaatetta (engl. differentation principle), jonka mukaisesti kehitys-
yhteistyörahat kohdennetaan niitä eniten tarvitseviin maihin, ensisijaisesti kaikkein 
köyhimpiin maihin. EU:n rahoituskehyksellä 2014-2020 kehitystyö lopetettiin eriyt-
tämisperiaatteen mukaisesti 19 Latinalaisen Amerikan ja Aasian keskitulon maassa.
Vaikka eriyttämisperiaatteen voidaan toisaalta nähdä olevan rationaalinen ope-
ratiivinen päätös, kehityspolitiikan näkökulmasta se on hankala. Pariisin ja Busanin 
periaatteiden mukaisesti kehitysyhteistyön täytyy olla tuloksellista, läpinäkyvää ja 
laadukasta, kumppanin tarpeisiin vastaavaa ja ennakoitavaa. Periaatteiden mukaises-
ti myös avunantajien tulee olla sitoutuneita apuun. Eriyttämisperiaatteen toimeenpa-
no on aiheuttanut huolta paitsi kohdemaissa, myös kansalaisyhteiskunnassa. Missä 
eriyttämisperiaatetta toteutettaisiin, millaisin kriteerein kohdemaat valittaisiin, ja 
miten se käytännössä vaikuttaisi meneillään oleviin etenkin monivuotisiin kehitys-
ohjelmiin, kumppanimaat ovat kysyneet. Vastauksena Euroopan komissio tarjosi 
valmistumista kehitysyhteistyöstä ja siten ohjelmien tuen lopettamista. 
Globaalisti eriyttämisperiaate liittyy läheisesti meneillään olevaan kehityspoliitti-
seen keskusteluun kehitysyhteistyön kohteista, ja siihen vastaako OECD:n virallinen 
kehitysavun vastaanottajamaiden lista nykypäivän globaalin, verkostoituneen talou-
den aiheuttamiin haasteisiin. Koska absoluuttinen köyhyys on viime vuosikymmeni-
nä vähentynyt, monet valtiot ovat siirtyneet köyhien maiden kategoriasta keskitulon 
maiden kategoriaan, minkä tuloksena suurin osa maailman köyhistä asuukin nyt 
keskitulon maissa, joissa sekä taloudellinen että sosiaalinen eriarvoisuus ovat mit-
tavia ongelmia. OECD:n kehitysavun vastaanottajamaiden listan mukaisesti nämä 
valtiot eivät välttämättä enää hyödy kehitysavusta. Riskinä on joutua väliinputoajan 
asemaan ja taantua takaisin köyhien maiden kategoriaan. 
Tutkimuskysymykseni keskittyvät eriyttämisperiaatteen kriteereihin, sekä sii-
hen, millaisin mittarein EU tarkastelee kehitysyhteistyökumppaneitaan ja miten se 
käsittelee eriarvoisuutta osana globaalia köyhyysongelmaa. Lisäksi tarkastelen eriyt-
tämisperiaatetta kehityspoliittisen johdonmukaisuuden näkökulmasta, vertaillen 
esimerkiksi poliittisia kannanottoja operatiivisiin ratkaisuihin ja komission rahoitus-
välineisiin.
Analyysini osoittaa, että EU:n valmiudet vastata köyhyyden ja eriarvoisuuden 
tuomiin haasteisiin ovat verrattain rajalliset. EU:n kehityspolitiikan voidaan nähdä 
olevan laaja-alaista korostaen esimerkiksi poliittista johdonmukaisuutta ja eri toimi-
joiden ja sektoreiden vastuuta köyhyyden poistamisessa, mutta EU:n ohjelmasuun-
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nittelu tai rahoitusvälineet eivät välttämättä vastaa EU:n poliittisia kannanottoja. 
Toisinaan ne ovat jopa ristiriidassa. Mitä tulee eriyttämisperiaatteen toteutukseen, 
näyttää, että kehitysyhteistyö lopetettiin joissakin kumppanimaissa ilman siirtymä-
vaihestrategioita, lähtökohtaisesti EU:n omien poliittisten tai taloudellisten motii-
vien vuoksi, ei välttämättä niinkään kumppanien toiveesta.
7
Acknowledgements
For as long as I can remember, I have been intrigued by different cultures, different 
world views, different ways of living and expressing oneself, and in the way they all 
are woven together into one world. The determination to try and make sense of it all 
to the extent that is even possible also became my profession, within which I continue 
to wonder what development actually is. In my view, the answer lies not only in 
understanding and embracing the existence of different cultures and societies around 
the globe, but also in understanding ourselves: in the ways we Europeans justify 
what we do in other regions where we are only visitors. I hope that this dissertation 
contributes to that fundamental debate.
Being passionate about development helps, but what has truly made this project 
worthy of, has been the opportunity to work with great people. While I celebrate the 
closure of one chapter, I do not take leaving my closest allies lightly; my supervisors 
Professor, Dr.Soc.Sc. Pekka Räsänen and Dr. Marikki Stocchetti, both of whom 
I would like to thank from the bottom of my heart, for being there always when 
needed, and by being the best possible examples of choosing careers out of a passion 
for what you do. Not only do I value you enormously as professionals from whom 
I have learned a lot, but I have also enjoyed working with you tremendously. It has 
been truly fun and a privilege and I hope this is the beginning, not the end.
I also owe thanks to all the reviewers of the draft manuscripts and fellow 
researchers in seminars and conferences who have provided invaluable comments 
that have allowed me to develop my thinking throughout the process. After all, no 
research matters if it is not reflected upon and shared with others. Sincere thanks also 
to the two reviewers, Dr. Hanna Ojanen and Dr. Patrick Holden –who also acted as 
my opponent − both of whose feedback was instrumental in shaping my final ideas 
into the dissertation at hand. 
Several European Union officials have contributed their invaluable insights in 
solving the research problems. I realize that the institution receives a steady flow of 
research requests, and I am therefore particularly grateful to these officials for making 
time to speak to me. Thank you Antti Karhunen, Norbert Probst, Corinna Valente, 
Gerald Hatler, Gauthier Charles de la Brousse, Jean-Emanuel Duliere, Mariusz 
Tamborski, Lorella de la Cruz Iglesias, Felix Burbulea, Donatella Montaldo, as well as 
those who did not wish their names to be published.
I also owe thanks to many of my former Save the Children colleagues: Anne 
Haaranen, thanks for having faith in me; Anne Kanene, asante sana for always being 
available and for being supportive of my plans to start working on a PhD; Olivia Lind 
8
Haldorsson, the result of sending me to the first MFF-meeting, (which I gathered 
was an ad-hoc decision in the absence of anybody else being available) is here in 
this dissertation so my enormous thanks for that. Manuela Smolinski, my comrade 
with whom I shared so many fun moments in the office and with whom we totally 
dismissed the idea that not everybody might share the same interest in financial 
instruments; and Eija Mustonen, with whom I have kept in touch for years after 
formally working together.
Also a whole group of dear friends has participated in my project in one way or 
another, willingly or by Hobson’s choice when I kept talking on the subject a tiny bit too 
long. Tiina Metsälä, I can always count on you and your sharp observations wrapped 
in an endless sense of humour; Sirkka Komppa, Susanna Remes and Sirkku Siltamies, 
always supportive in your own witty ways that are guaranteed to make me laugh, 
thanks for giving me refuge from my work as well as critical remarks when needed; 
Venla Leskinen, we have proven that physical distance is just a detail, thank you for 
always being there with your intelligent and spot-on observations, and with your 
gift for linguistics that I have shamelessly taken advantage of; Denise Stuckenbruck, 
suffice to say, you are a star in many categories, thank you for all the past and future 
talks; and Kitta Ripatti with whom I share so many values and interests in life; despite 
your young age you long ago earned the honorary title of village elder in our family. 
Thanks for giving me gentle prods and always being positive and supportive. 
Lastly, none of this would have been possible or meaningful without the support 
of my family: my in-laws Christine and Guido La Tella, who have taken time to read 
and reflect on the topic with me, not to mention having provided fantastic facilities 
to work in Paris; my father Jyrki, who has always trusted my judgement, shared my 
enthusiasm and backed all my sound and occasionally questionable ideas. Thank you 
all. A great inspiration in my life, and this project is no exception, has also been my 
grandmother, mummi, Paula Ranta, who would have been proud today. Lastly, thank 
you Maxime, we have already experienced so much together and there is no end to 
that in sight yet. The most important support in all possible ways has come from you, 
and I hope that someday I can return some of it in one form or another.





Original Publications ................................................................................. 11
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................12
1. Introduction ................................................................................ 14
2.	Differentiated	Development	Cooperation	Put	into	Context:	
Transformation from the MDGs to the SDGs .......................... 18
Different goals, different ideologies: From MDGs to SDGs ............... 18
From least developed and low income to middle income 
countries, global trajectory ................................................................ 19
Parallels: donor policies and assistance ........................................... 20
3. The European	Way	to	Development ......................................... 22
The principles of EU development policy .......................................... 22
4.	Inequality	and	Poverty	Research	in	the	Changing	World ...... 25
Aid and the transition in emerging economies: the “MIC” argument . 29
Development assistance and the “political power” argument ............ 30
To give and to give up: the “global public goods” argument  ............. 31
Value for ODA: the “efficiency” argument .......................................... 32
5.	Tailor-Made	Aid	for	Effective	Cooperation:	the	Anatomy	of	
Differentiation ............................................................................. 35
Differentiation as the EU’s operational principle ................................ 36
Differentiation and Policy Coherence for Development..................... 37
Policy coherence and the EU single market ..................................... 39
6.	Research	Questions,	Data	and	Methodology .......................... 41
Research problem and questions ..................................................... 41
Research Data .................................................................................. 43
Nodal points and the floating signifier ............................................... 44
Research Method .............................................................................. 45
The problem of inequality in differentiation .............................. 46
Policy coherence for development in differentiation ................ 47
What comes next? Tax good governance in the EU 
internal markets and in third countries ..................................... 49
10
7. Results – Overview of the Research Articles .......................... 51
Article 1: Inequality and poverty: The ill-fitting pieces in the EU’s 
development partnerships (Pilke & Stocchetti, 2016) ....................... 51
Article 2: Partnerships in transition: the case of the EU and 
middle-income countries (MICs) (Pilke, 2016) .................................. 54
Article 3: Practicing or preaching? Linking taxation and 
sustainable development in EU foreign policy (Pilke & Räsänen, 
2018) ................................................................................................. 57
8. Discussion and Conclusions .................................................... 61
Global political economy and post-development models  ................. 63
Limitations of the study and future research ..................................... 65
Research recommendations for the future ........................................ 67
Conclusions .................................................................................... 70
List of References .......................................................................... 72
Appendices ..................................................................................... 79
Appendix 1. EU Data Sources, Official Documents .......................... 79
Appendix 2. Key Concepts ................................................................ 85
Appendix 3. List of interview questions ............................................. 91
Original Publications .................................................................................93
Poverty, inequality, and differentiation: The ill-fitting pieces in the 
EU’s development partnerships ........................................................ 93
Partnerships in transition, the case of the EU and the MICs ........... 117
Practicing or preaching? Linking taxation and sustainable 
development in EU foreign policy .................................................... 131
11
Original Publications
I Pilke, R. & Stocchetti, M. (2016). Poverty, inequality, and differentiation: The 
ill-fitting pieces in the EU’s development partnerships. Regions and Cohesion, 
6(1), 1-22.
II Pilke, R. (2016). Partnerships in transition, the case of the EU and the MICs. 
Development in Practice, 26 (6), 719-730.
III Pilke, R. & Räsänen, P. (2018). Practicing or preaching? Linking taxation 




ACP  African, Caribbean and the Pacific
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy
CSP  Country Strategy Paper
CCCTB  Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
DCI  Development Cooperation Instrument
DG  Directorate-General
EC  European Commission
ECDPM  European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECLAC  United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
EDF  European Development Fund
EEAS  European External Action Service
EU  European Union
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment
FPI  Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
FATF  Financial Action Task Force
FTA  Free Trade Agreement
FTT  Financial Transaction Tax
GNI  Gross National Income
GNP  Gross National Product
GPGC  Global Public Goods and Challenges
GSP  Generalized Scheme of Preferences
HDI  Human Development Index
HIC  High Income Country
IMF  International Monetary Fund
LDC  Least Developed Country
LIC  Low Income Country
LMIC  Lower Middle Income Country
LRRD  Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MDG  Millennium Development Goal
MFF  Multiannual Financial Framework
MIC  Middle Income Country
MIP  Multiannual Indicative Programme
13
MNC  Multinational corporation
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP  National Indicative Programme
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OECD  The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD DAC The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Development Assistance Committee
PCD  Policy Coherence for Development
PFM  Public Financial Management
PI  Partnership Instrument
RBA  Rights-Based Approach
SMEs  Small and medium size enterprises
SWD  Staff Working Document
TEU  Treaty of the European Union, “Maastricht Treaty”
TOSSD  Total Official Support for Development Assistance
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UPR  Universal Peer Review
14
1. Introduction
“Development, after all, is complicated. It is not linear. It is not 
binary. It is a moving target.” (A. Barcena, S. Manservisi, and M. 
Pezzini, 2017) 
This dissertation scrutinizes the differentiated approach to development; an approach 
that was considered to be a crucial policy and operational change in the European 
Union’s (EU) development cooperation in the Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) 2014-2020. The origins of the differentiation principle according to the 
Agenda for Change, the EU’s updated development policy of 2011 that paved the way 
to the upcoming MFF, was in the call for targeting resources where “they are needed 
the most to address poverty reduction and where they could have the greatest impact” 
(European Commission 2011a: 9). Whereas the Agenda for Change left criteria for 
differentiation largely undefined, it already set the regions where the EU should focus 
its development funding with “particular importance” (Ibid.). 
The key developments that led to these changes can be traced back to around 
2010, which marked the onset of change for global (development) relations. The 
Arab Spring, stretching over the coming years, brought the world to a point of no 
return with massive social, political, and economic repercussions. The year 2010 was 
also the beginning of international collaboration that continued over the next five 
years, up until the international community was due to agree on the next generation 
development goals that were to follow the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Although poverty in absolute terms had been reduced in an impressive number of Low 
Income Countries (LICs) in the MDGs era, both individual citizens and politicians 
were asking: at what cost? An increased awareness of growing income and social 
inequalities in both rich and developing countries, and of the planet’s ecological limits 
to achieving what we have commonly perceived as development, created a strong 
sense of a need for a change, even if the ideas of what kind of change was needed 
were (and continue to be) different between local and global citizens’ movements, 
local communities, ethnic groups and cultures, states and international institutions. 
For the EU, one of the world’s largest development donors and a neighbour of the 
Mediterranean countries Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, the Arab 
Spring was a wake-up call that set in motion a process of re-thinking the EU’s security 
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and development policies, and its partnerships with the Northern African states and 
the Middle East. These shifting priorities eventually had an influence on the EU’s 
partnerships with all third countries. 
Around the same period, negotiations on the next seven-year budget cycle of EU, 
the MFF 2014-2020, took off in an obviously difficult political climate: Europe had 
experienced a severe economic recession following the 2008 bursting of the housing 
bubble in the US, which at its worst led to the bailing out of Greece by other member 
states. The recession was followed by high unemployment rates and severe austerity 
measures that put constraints on European citizens’ personal lives and caused them to 
doubt in the political elites. Partially as a consequence of these events, the UK under 
the leadership of David Cameron opened Pandora’s Box in the form of a referendum 
on EU membership, which began to occupy much space on the EU’s agenda right 
from the onset of the idea. The referendum finally took place in 2016 and led to 
Brexit negotiations being extended over several years to come. 
Despite its internal challenges, the EU took a visible role on the international stage 
post-2015; engaging with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) project and 
participating closely in the drafting process. Simultaneously it was revising its internal 
development policy and cooperation models with third countries. The Agenda for 
Change paved the way for changes to be introduced in the MFF 2014-2020. It was a 
product of its time with demands for more value for money, transparency on the ways 
European public money is used, stricter conditionalities imposed on partners, and 
the spending of development funding where it would have most impact. The policy 
also adopted stronger rhetoric on inclusive (economic) growth than the European 
Consensus for Development (2006), which emphasized inclusive development – a 
small but significant difference indicating the changing priorities of the EU. 
Figure 1: A decade of development policy changes in the EU.
In the MFF 2014-2020, differentiation was introduced in nineteen countries: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
16
Riina Pilke
Uruguay, Venezuela, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Maldives, Malaysia, Kazakhstan 
and Thailand. But why does differentiation merit an entire dissertation? It seems like 
a sound principle by means of which scarce development funding can be efficiently 
distributed to different parts of the world that struggle with an array of environmental, 
political and economic challenges. Nonetheless being steadfastly linked to the larger 
debate of where, how and by whom development cooperation should be carried out, 
differentiation has been a source of serious operational, normative, political and 
instrumental concerns both in the European Commission and among the affected 
partners. On the political side it caused internal disputes due to the member states’ 
historical ties with the countries in question, and of course had a major influence on 
the relationships between them and the EU. As for normative concerns, it for example 
brought out questions about the EU’s responsibility towards vulnerable groups, and 
whether the EU practices the rights-based approach that it preaches or even acts 
against international agreements such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
and the Accra Agenda for Action (2005), and the Busan partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (2012). 
Those working on the operational side had to think where to move next, and 
how to respond to the partners experiencing the gap that the closed development 
programmes might have left, and what kind of exit strategies were available. In addition, 
very few alternatives were considered in terms of definitions of differentiation: by 
and large it meant a complete cutback of development aid to the aforementioned 
countries at that point in time. When it comes to instrumental concerns and as the 
decision was to be effective in the MFF 2014-2020, differentiation was an inherent 
part of the re-design process of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), 
and caused concerns particularly with regards to the eligibility criteria for different 
aid modalities set out in the DCI regulation. Most importantly though, the way 
the differentiated approach to development was defined by the EU discarded one 
of the most important and most hotly debated development concerns of our time: 
inequality. 
The reduction of economic and social inequalities in their various forms has 
become one of the red lines in the context of the SDGs with a shared realization that 
inequalities are root causes of economic, social and political instability. During the 
design phase of the SDGs – although not necessarily as a result of that particular 
project – many scholars, civil society members and politicians drew attention to 
inequality as a development problem. Around 2014 Oxfam published its much-
cited claim of one per cent of the world’s richest controlling around half the world’s 
wealth (Oxfam, 2014; The Guardian, 20 January 2014). Though many researchers 
would be cautious to endorse it due to the difficulty of verifying it with reliable data 
or methods, it has become an oft-repeated refrain that the general public can relate 
to. Additionally, in the same year, the French economist Thomas Piketty published 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, which quickly became a popular, internationally 
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recognized landmark study on the evolution of (economic) inequality. Also the 
OECD, now developing slogans such as “bridging divides” to tackle inequality (OECD 
Forum 2017), began to work on new definitions of development that would better 
correspond to the problem of inequality as related to poverty eradication, whether 
examined as a within-country or between-country phenomenon.
Examining the EU’s differentiated approach to development in a broader context 
of sustainable development, inequality and poverty reduction are central themes of 
the study at hand and are linked to the differentiated approach to development in 
many ways. Firstly, all countries where the differentiation principle was to be applied 
have experienced relatively rapid economic growth when measured by GNI or GDP, 
leaving the countries with high income disparities and social inequality between 
their citizens behind. How to deal with extremely poor populations in relatively well-
off states with positive economic outlooks is not only a question of development 
cooperation, but also a matter of wealth re-distribution that gives new importance to 
the notion of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) as an approach for poverty 
eradication. Do these countries have adequate financial management systems in 
place, do they wish to have external support in the building of such systems, what 
is the impact of international trade and taxation, and to what extent should other 
countries or private sector take responsibility for their offshore operations are 
questions that the international community continues to ponder. Moreover, the 
suitability of the growth dogmas with regard to the planet’s ecological limits, growing 
human population and to halting climate change are issues that have opened up 
current development cooperation principles to new, much needed discussions. 
This dissertation investigates differentiation primarily from a socio-economic 
and development stance. Theoretically it combines economic sociology, EU and 
development studies, and political economic research. It includes three research 
articles published in 2016 and in 2018, and an introductory section. This introduction 
comprises eight chapters, beginning with setting the context by reviewing the main 
changes in the shift from the MDGs to the SDGs as relevant to the research topic. 
In the third chapter I briefly review the EU as a development actor, after which I 
turn to examining the phenomena of inequality and poverty in more general terms. 
I focus mainly on the international principles for development aid, and where they 
leave Middle Income Countries (MICs) that have experienced vast donor flight in 
recent years. The chapter is followed by an unpacking of the notion of differentiation, 
beginning with sociological theory and ending in an analysis of how it is used as an 
approach in development cooperation. Chapter six presents the research questions 
and methodology of the analysis. An overview of the results of the three research 
articles are presented in chapter seven, which is followed by a final discussion and 
conclusions in chapter eight. 
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2. Differentiated Development Cooperation 
Put into Context: Transformation from 
the MDGs to the SDGs
Coming into force in 2001, the MDGs served as the global development agenda for 
fifteen good years, during which many countries moved from the LIC to the MIC 
category as per OECD categorization. Although critical voices towards the Goals 
have always existed, it would be unjust to state that by aligning poverty reduction 
efforts for the benefit of the world’s poor the MDGs did not work. By being chiefly 
concerned with the widening gap between rich and poor in the North-South axis 
– or in Quah’s (1996) words, twin peaks of the polarized world − their greatest 
weakness was the sole focus on developing countries discarding the inter-relatedness 
of different parts of the world. 
Different goals, different ideologies: From MDGs to 
SDGs
Although not all scholars sign up to the claim, for many the MDGs are a result of 
decades of neoliberal economic policies in the powerful Western countries. At their 
heart has been the preference for minimal government interference in the functions 
of the markets. For poverty reduction this meant the promotion of chiefly economic – 
“inclusive”, as the most common discourse establishes − growth, where the role of the 
states has been to create an enabling business environment that is accessible to market 
actors. The State for its par was expected to take responsibility for different aspects of 
social development, including the provision of health services, education and social 
protection, and to regulate the use of natural resources for greater environmental 
sustainability and protection. The goal of economic growth has been the foundation 
of development cooperation as can be seen in the definition of development aid by 
the OECD, which categorizes countries into LICs, MICs and High Income Countries 
(HICs), which in turn serve as eligibility criteria for Official Development Aid 
(ODA). Growth measured in GNI has also been a generally accepted indicator for 
poverty reduction up until relatively recently (cf. Ogujiuba & Jumare, 2012; Carant, 
2017; OECD, 2017). 
While the 1990s and 2000s were considered as a globally successful period of 
poverty reduction during which a large number of countries moved from LIC to MIC 
category, a growing pool of scholars question the success of the neoliberal growth 
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project. Focus on GNI for decades changed the global political geography of poverty, 
and we are now witnessing greater in-country inequalities and critical limits to the 
use of natural resources while dealing with a continuously growing population. As 
has been argued, GNI rates were increased at the expense of human development 
in general, and of women’s empowerment and the provision of quality education in 
particular (Ogujiuba & Jumare, 2012). Perhaps most critically, as already argued, 
the MDGs were developed within the prevailing neoliberal system; therefore the 
agenda was hardly expected to change the structures that produced the present 
levels of poverty in the first place (Briant Carant, 2017). In contrast, the SDGs still 
serve the dominant global economic system, but they embrace a language of shared 
responsibility for poverty eradication, sustainable development and responsible use of 
limited resources and wealth re-distribution in comparison with the growth discourse 
of the MDGs era. The SDGs are also considerably more attentive to the causalities in 
poverty reduction and to closing of the gaps created by unequal outcomes of global 
and national economic and social structures, injustice in opportunities of individuals 
and the exclusion of social groups (Freistein & Mahlert, 2016: 2145). Notably, the 
SDGs take a horizontal bearing on the reduction of inequalities across the Goals. This 
strategy calls for an increasingly multi-layered approach to development planning: 
broad definitions of poverty that include analyses of the root causes of it, of socio-
political factors, and of decision-making structures and processes in a society (Ibid.). 
From least developed and low income to middle 
income countries, global trajectory
In 1996 the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) listed seventy-three 
least developed (LDCs) or low-income countries, and whereas the number of LICs 
was on the rise until the new millennium, it began to fall after 2000 (Sumner, 2016). 
Today there are altogether forty-nine countries in these categories. A majority of 
them are in Africa (in 2018 thirty-four of the countries are African compared to 
a total of forty-four in 1996). These statistics follow the drastic change in the way 
poverty is distributed globally on one hand and the way wealth is concentrated on 
the other. Whereas some countries have moved from LDC category to LIC or MIC 
category, some countries, such as certain Eastern European countries, China and 
South Africa, have moved to the upper MIC category. As for Latin America and Asia, 
many countries have moved from lower MIC to upper MIC category, but significantly 
fewer have experienced a shift from MIC to high income category (Chile and Uruguay 
and most recently Argentina and Panama being the exceptions).
Many of the countries that have crossed over from LIC to MIC category, including 
giants such as China and India, continue to be socio-politically, economically or 
environmentally fragile, often also at risk of natural disasters: in 2017 51 per cent of 
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humanitarian funds that were requested by the UN were for crisis responses in MICs 
(UNOCHA, OECD, 2018). From a point of view of development partnerships, the 
MICs are not easily categorized thanks to their heterogeneity, but they are home to 
over 70 per cent of the world’s poor with development challenges, such as limited 
access to health care, clean water and sanitation, and general human security.1 
Taking into account these fragility factors, Sumner has launched the notion of 
“genuine and premature graduation”, referring to the country’s risk of falling back 
into the LIC category (Sumner, 2016: 15). What is of particular relevance here 
is that studies show that countries have become richer because of the resultant 
increase in their assets in the loosest sense of the word (i.e. their “residing wealth”) 
but at the same time, governments have become poorer as a result of an imbalance 
between private (which is controlled by a very small population) and public wealth 
(Alvaredo et al., 2018).
Parallels: donor policies and assistance
As the geopolitics of poverty has changed, so have the development assistance flows, 
even if not quite in the same direction. Overall economic development – and the 
fact that development on the mere basis of GDP / GNI growth has not been truly 
questioned outside of the academia in the past − has made a number of countries far 
less dependent on development aid, which is undoubtedly the core idea of external 
assistance. However, whether or not the recipient countries themselves have declared 
the need for development assistance, GNI growth exceeding the MIC threshold has 
already set in motion donor flight from the newer MICs, leaving an epic blind spot 
as regards inequality as part of the world’s poverty problem, and thereby risking the 
creation of forgotten poverty pockets in developing and well-off economies. Many 
OECD DAC members, including countries such as Finland, Sweden, Luxembourg 
and Ireland, had taken decisions to focus aid on least developed countries. However, 
albeit with good intentions, those sort of political decisions also come with challenges: 
almost half of the aid to LDCs worldwide was channelled to only seven countries 
1 The UN defines human security as the people’s right to “live in freedom and dignity, 
free from poverty and despair… with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and 
fully develop their human potential” (UN General Assembly, 66th Session “Follow up 
to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome”). It refers to 
a wide array of factors that contribute to the feeling of personal / communal security, 
including security from violence and crime, economic, food, environmental, health, 
and political security (UNDP Human Development Report Office).
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in 2014-2105 (OECD, 2017).2 As for MICs, bilateral aid globally has been declining 
since the early 2000s, hitting bottom in the case of upper MICs in 2012-2013, and a 
year earlier in the case of lower MICs. A slight increase may be observed since 2015, 
coinciding with the SDGs coming into force. (Ibid.: 145) 
Timing is an important factor and one of the themes of this research. Until 
around 2010, when the global discussion as to what the next generation development 
goals should look like began, inequality as part of the world’s poverty problem 
(or its repercussions on global peace and stability) remained largely an academic 
debate, and not so much a concern among development practitioners. To that end, 
the general opinion among donors was that the MICs have the resources to deal 
with their poverty, and the answer lies in wealth re-distribution. Today, however, 
precisely because of the positive overall economic development of the newer MICs, 
the development communities are asking what can be learned from the processes and 
how to prevent gaps between rich and poor widening in the future. Domestic resource 
mobilization as part of donor policies is becoming more and more important as a re-
distributive mechanism, but perhaps there is now also an increased recognition of a 
need for transition periods in the MICs when it comes to development cooperation 
or international cooperation in a wider sense.
It is against this background that the global SDGs project was born. To name 
just a few, economists such as Thomas Piketty with his study on inequality (2014); 
Amartya Sen with his extensive work around the notion of capability-poverty (cf. Sen, 
2000); Joseph Stiglitz with his long-standing work on poverty reduction and more 
recently, on the elimination of inequality (cf. Doyle & Sitglitz, 2014); Kate Raworth, 
challenging the objective of GDP growth as a measure for sustainable development 
and calling for metrics that include economic, human, natural and social assets (The 
Worldwatch Institute, 2013); and Andy Sumner with his work on the newer MICs, 
have all brought to light grave global concerns that the MDGs did not address, but 
that the SDGs attempt to draw attention to. In other words, following the MDGs that 
were based on the twin peaks; one peak of extreme poverty and one of wealth, the 
SDGs are more attentive to the new middles of the world (Sumner, 2016). 
2 These countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ethiopia, Myanmar, South Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania. However, it 
should be noted that overall ODA to LDCs according to OECD has fallen due to e.g. 
growing migration and subsequent increased ODA expenditure in home countries; the 
increase of concessional lending that targets chiefly MICs; and, increased channelling of 
ODA to multilateral cooperation.
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3. The European Way to Development
In many ways the EU is a unique player in international relations and worthy of 
many definitions, some reflecting the ideals it wants to convey to others, some the 
occasional confusion inside the institution. The EU has been described for example 
as an “unidentified political object” (Orbie, 2008: 2), “civilian power” (Freres, 2003) 
−and in that specific context, an “old power” (Duchêne, 1972; 1973 in Orbie, 2008; 4), 
which refers to a debate around the EU as a military or a normative actor; “normative 
power Europe” (Manners, 2002) or “ethical power” (Hyde-Price, 2008); “Fortress 
Europe” (Orbie, 2008b) for its protectionist trade policies; and by those who take an 
altogether more critical view of the EU as a power: “EUtopia” for its projections of 
what it wishes to be rather than what it is (Nikolaïdis and Howse, 2002 in Stocchetti, 
2013: 24); possibly no longer much more than a “Chinese whisperer” (Mayer, 2008), 
and a “tragic actor” (Hyde-Price, 2008). In the context of development cooperation, 
it has been referred to as the “sleeping giant” (Makhan, Gänzle, & Grimm, 2012, in 
Carbone, 2012) for its thus far unrealized potential. 
Some researchers have suggested that the EU’s distinctiveness from other 
global actors lies in the formation of a relatively tight group of countries with a 
specific type of capitalism, which is characterized by highly coordinated market 
economies and state regulated markets (cf. Trigilia, 2002). While these views deserve 
legitimate support for instance in the light of the European single market project, 
the homogeneity of the EU countries may also be considered to a certain extent as 
an artificial juxtaposition created by the institutional premises of the Union. In fact 
this apparent “level playing field” is paradoxically also fertile ground for a range of 
problems, effectively also creating a space for disputes and disagreements that in turn 
militates against the operationalization of the EU’s own policies. In other words, even 
if the policies embody common EU visions, in reality the EU Member States are 
rather different types of market economies and welfare systems and different also in 
terms of how robust the synergies created between the two may be. 
The principles of EU development policy
In order to understand the EU’s evolving development cooperation, it is worth looking 
briefly into the general institutional approaches on social development in Europe. In 
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the case of the Nordic countries a salient focus on gender equality in labour markets 
by provision of universal child care and other social services in the 1970s and 1980s 
has been a ground-breaking factor in reducing poverty and inequalities. The soon to 
exit UK has, within its own borders, chosen a somewhat different socio-structural 
route, closer to the path of the US with more neoliberal employment policies than to 
that of the “Nordics in the North”.3 This has resulted in more in-country inequalities 
but more flexible labour markets than in the Northern Member States. Continental 
Europe forms the third institutional approach within the EU: that of relatively 
under-developed social services, especially for families, in favour of more elaborate 
employment and pension policies. (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
European welfare state building paths are important also in the context of a 
common EU development policy that stipulates the ways the institution forms 
partnerships with developing countries. While the country-specific approaches 
to social protection and welfare differ, the “Nordic” approach to development 
cooperation crosses these internal divisions of the Union. The Nordic countries have 
been traditionally like-minded, and have largely initiated, coordinated and driven the 
common EU development agenda (Elgström, 2015). These countries have introduced 
the elements of welfare states familiar to them from their own systems, such as state-
coordinated taxation for equal social protection, gender equality, democracy and 
good governance into EU development policy. However those same policies in Europe 
have made the EU more vulnerable to an outflow of capital and to fierce competition 
in the labour markets, persistent unemployment, a high income tax burden (that 
risks becoming even higher) on individuals but low corporate taxes, and tendencies 
towards the privatization of services so as to ease the pressure of expanding public 
sectors. Job markets in Europe have generally been less flexible than in emerging 
economies that have experienced steep growth of GNI (Trigilia, 2002).
“The European way” for development cooperation entails combining the objective 
of poverty eradication with respect for human rights and democratic governance, 
values that were introduced to EU development cooperation in the 1990’s (Elgström 
& Pilegaard, 2010). Orbie & Manners, who prefer the term “norms” over “values”, 
state that the EU is a normatively constructed polity and add liberty, fundamental 
freedoms, social solidarity, non-discrimination and sustainable development to these 
ideals, (Orbie, 2008a:18). These norms, corresponding to the stated EU values in 
the official documents, are the cornerstone of the EU’s development policy, and are 
3 The UK, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries Sweden, Denmark and Finland, are 
often referred to as the Nordic countries in the context of the EU development policy, 
thanks to their generally aligned (though not necessarily unified) thinking compared 
to the rest of the EU member states. The categorization is commonly used in policy 
and advocacy texts and research. With “Nordics in the North” I specifically refer to 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
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the distinctive element in the EU’s actorness (Carbone, 2010), usually as opposed to 
another major global actor, the USA. 
Even if the EU is unique in terms of the mix of policies and practices it emphasizes 
in global relations, it is still global team player that seeks coherence outside EU 
policies, and it aligns its norms and rules to the international ones (Lavenex & 
Schimmelfennig, 2009: 801). To that end, EU development policy has also been 
matched to international development frameworks, first the MDGs, and since 2015, 
the SDGs (European Commission, 2006; Holland, 2008; 2010), at least in so far as 
they have not conflicted with the EU’s internal or other foreign policy areas. The EU 
is also an active player in international politics that seeks to influence global agendas, 
and with its participation in the drafting phase, the EU can take some credit – for 
better or worse − for the way the SDGs appear today. 
By and large, this “EU-style development cooperation” has changed relatively 
little over time. Rather, development policy rhetoric has been enriched with a deeper 
commitment to both the values and the elements that are supposed to glue poverty 
eradication and development to other policy niches. Nevertheless, plenty of literature 
also establishes the contrast between the EU’s more supposedly altruistic values and 
its often poorly-hidden pursuit of its own interests. For example, the EU has been 
repeatedly condemned for heavy external finance flows to its neighbourhood instead 
of to the least developed countries, or other regions in general (cf. Hurt, 2009; Hout, 
2007). This critique also suggests that EU development cooperation is characterized 
by a level of ostentatious post-colonial self-congratulation incommensurate with 
reality in terms of practical success on the ground as well as being accused of aiming 
to Europeanize the rest of the world with an aid system that is based on incentives and 
conditionalities (cf. Vogt, 2006; Murray, 2010). At the heart of this type of criticism 
lies the idea of the EU as a neoliberal actor for which development cooperation 
is a stalking horse for free trade agreements (FTAs) (Meunier & Nikolaïdis, 2006; 
Fioramonti & Poletti, 2008; Hurt, 2010). Using normative rhetoric in development 
has provoked similar criticism. Examples are numerous; for instance Langan posits 
that the EU has “long utilized normative discourses without becoming entrapped” 
(Langan, 2009: 434) for private sector development under the auspices of Aid for 
Trade programmes in developing countries. The chief aim has been to endorse 
economic partnership agreements which essentially advance EU interest in trade 
liberalization and the opening up of lucrative markets in African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries. Furthermore, FTA negotiations, which are one of the 
EU’s main instruments of partnership globally and allegedly a tool to facilitate the 
partners’ integration into global markets, have been likewise criticized for their 
imbalanced outcomes with potentially minor benefits for the partners and major 
gains for European firms with free access to emerging markets (Fioramonti & Poletti, 
2008; Robles Jr., 2008; Carbone, 2010; Icaza, 2010).
25
4. Inequality and Poverty Research 
in the Changing World
By and large the Western research tradition has problematized inequality either 
through economic or social lenses. Whereas economists have focused on the impact 
of inequality and re-distributive mechanisms such as taxation, on (economic) growth, 
social scientists have approached inequality through the notions of power, equality/
equity, social inclusion / exclusion and accountability. Economic sociologists have 
moved between the two by attempting to make sense of the roles of states and 
international institutions as market regulators on one hand and liberal markets on 
the other (cf. Block & Evans, 2005; Fligstein, 2005), and on social order with notable 
focus on studying the welfare state (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber & Stephens, 
2005). An emerging field is also the evolution of global economy, production networks 
and global commodity chains and how they may exercise power over developing 
economies and elsewhere (Gereffi, 2005).
As for the ways economic sociologists have understood and explained 
development, Trigilia distinguishes two specific epochs in modernization and 
development research. The first wave of research focused on dependency theories 
and was followed by the emergence of comparative political economy (Trigilia, 
2002: 148). This second wave led to the present-day phase loaded with fundamental 
questions relating to the changing international agenda, and to contemplations on the 
benefits – or alternatives − for liberal economics, development, sustainability, and the 
roles, the rights and the responsibilities of states, corporations and individuals within 
them. In many Western countries the doctrines supportive of liberal economies are 
replaced by neo-protectionism, and “policies excoriated by the right – nationalization, 
higher taxes, Keynesian economics, financial regulation – are back on the agenda of 
liberal capitalist economies” (Wade, 2009: 540). For development cooperation, an 
epoch divider has been the transition from the World Bank’s Washington Consensus 
to a Post-Washington Consensus – an ideological shift by the Western donors from 
an undisputed trust in the power of free markets to the recognition of the (state) 
institutions’ regulative role in the inclusive growth which took place around the 
Millennium (Saad-Filho, 2010). Since the Post-Washington Consensus period we 
are again experiencing a change, this time towards an era of multi-polarity and 
multiple modernities, contesting the post-colonial, Cold War and early post-Cold 
War, Western-led world we knew (Petito, 2016: 84). 
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Current research trends stem from the realization that just as economic growth 
did not solve the structural problems of poverty, large increases in development aid 
alone did not automatically lead to better development outcomes (Fischer, 2009: 863). 
Traditional development cooperation that includes institution-building for more 
efficient resource management may even be counterproductive if the international 
community does not consider the related global systems and agreements (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, the old donors are being challenged to take a critical look at their 
own systems, where the production of goods has typically decreased while income 
generated by fluid financial markets and rentier capitalism continues to increase. It 
should be noted here that by “old donors” I refer to the USA, which with its Marshall 
aid is a pioneer in development cooperation; and especially the older EU members 
with a long tradition of development assistance in Africa, the Caribbean, Asia, Pacific 
and South America. Understanding and acting upon these factors is key in shaping 
sustainable societies. 
The changing world order has compelled researchers from different disciplines 
to explain multiple forms of inequality. Inequality is not a new research agenda per 
se, but inequality as part of the poverty problem is a relatively fresh angle to existing 
poverty research, stemming from the need to consider relative poverty in new 
terms. Inequality, however, is a trying concept, and explaining it is a difficult job and 
however it is explained there are guaranteed to be well-evidenced counter-arguments 
from others. There is great variation in terms of levels of inequality, the pace with 
which it increases or decreases, and the socio-economic and political circumstances 
in which inequality occurs globally (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010; Ravaillon, 2018). 
Underscoring the need for social and behavioural analysis in development planning, 
there is no universal evidence that economic growth or currently existing inclusive 
growth policies would lead to an increase or decrease in inequality. Furthermore, the 
data collection methods currently available are not sensitive enough for individual 
behaviour, and they tend to under-report the income of the well-off individuals in a 
society (Ravaillon, 2018). They also do not disaggregate intra-household distribution 
of income, which is a major concern in development programming. 
Leaving aside the conceptual challenges, evidence does in any event suggest that 
between-country inequalities have decreased while within-country inequalities have 
in many settings increased in the past decades (Bourgoignon, 2015; Ravaillon, 2018). 
There also seems to be a consensus that inequality is bad for development, that the 
reduction of it is a “sine qua non” for poverty alleviation (Van der Hoeven, 2010: 
26); or that “lower net inequality seems to drive faster and more durable growth 
for a given level of re-distribution” (Ostry, Berg & Tsangarides, 2014: 6); and that 
inequality “seems to matter in itself and is not just proxying for other factors” (Berg 
& Ostry, 2014: 187). Research also shows that the patterns of inequality are hard to 
break, and they appear more resistant to change than poverty alone (Bebbington et 
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al., 2008: 4). Studies likewise suggest that economic growth is subject to, and fuel 
for, inequality especially during periods of rapid growth (Sumner & Mallett, 2013: 
2). Moreover, it seems, accepting the scarcity of data and the challenges it brings 
for measuring inequality worldwide, that relative development of incomes during 
growth appears to leave the poorest behind, even if “growth is still good for the poor” 
in terms of average increase in income (Dollar, Kleineberg & Kraay, 2013). Relative 
inequality also seems to be inconvenient in mainstream economic systems, as it leads 
to economic inefficiency, capital flight and rent-seeking (Todaro & Smith, 2011: 220), 
and less sustained growth (Berg & Ostry, 2014). 
Focusing on economic/income inequality alone is fundamentally too narrow an 
approach to deal with existing complex poverty challenges. Inequality is a contextual 
phenomenon that changes over time and is influenced, produced and re-produced by 
a range of economic and socio-cultural values in different types of power settings. The 
construction of political systems and the institutions within them plays a particularly 
important role in societal processes, as “they embody social norms which shape the 
behaviour of individuals about what it is appropriate to want and to do” (Grown, 
Elson & Catagay, 2000: 1148, in Sabates-Wheeler, 2008: 63). To that end, no doubt 
quality of life and human security factors, which stem from fulfilling the basic needs 
such as personal health, security or access to clean water, and from the individual’s 
subjective experience of sustainable, decent, secure and holistically good quality life 
(cf. Sen, 1999; Alonso, Glennie & Sumner, 2014; Gupta & Vegelin, 2016), are subject 
to (politico-economic) power and to the choices the political elites make. Sociologists 
and anthropologists are at home with these types of concerns, which generally have 
received only little attention in international development politics or in development 
programme design. Contemporary social development research is concerned as 
much with definitions as it is with the processes of development: transferring and 
translating goods and ideas and conversing ideologies. As Mosse writes, “the power 
lies in the narratives of the organization’s own definition of the problem…” which in 
development planning inevitably leads to “the need for translating one set of interests 
into another” (Mosse, 2005: 8). The notion of power, thus, is intertwined with the 
notions of interests, dominance and resistance in complex ways and the failure of 
development interventions is often a consequence of underestimating, miscalculating 
or discarding prevailing local power structures, and overestimating the hegemony of 
Western development institutions. 
The ways in which inequality is ascribed to the notion of power seem to confirm 
that inequality re-creates inequality, and that inequality in one group occurs as a result 
of the powerful others (Mosse, 2010). While these types of positivistic conclusions 
also seem risky, studies that focus on the links between cultural values and economic 
growth help to explain why some societies have succeeded in building more equal and 
equitable structures than others. To that end, for example Granato et al. (2014) have 
28
Riina Pilke
established a potentially higher risk of abuse of power (nepotism) in cultures where 
obedience is a highly valued norm. In this regard, to deal with inequality, societies 
must deal with relationships of inequality − yet “the scope for doing so is restricted 
because of the relations of inequality” (Bebbington et al., 2008: 6). This leads to other 
globally significant problems of peace and security, social gaps for example in health 
and education (cf. Farmer, 2003) and polarization (Esteban & Ray, 1994; Seshanna & 
Decornez, 2003). 
Whilst modelling inequality as part of the world’s poverty problem has not yet 
fully taken shape in order to be translated into development planning, theoretical 
meeting points do exist. Francois Bourgoignon for example in his study on 
inequality emphasizes the need for both economic and social analysis of inequality. 
As an analytical illustration he takes up employment, which on one hand from a 
technocratic data evaluation perspective is a factor that contributes to income 
inequality one way or another. The other side of the coin, a qualitative approach to 
employment, is concerned with unemployment as a risk factor for social exclusion, 
deprivation of personal opportunities, employment precariousness, a lack of decent 
jobs and discrimination in the labour markets (Bourgoignon 2015: 63−64). Also the 
widely cited report of Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi (2009) 
takes both horizontal and vertical stances – incorporating non-market activities and 
a household level income-consumption relationship − to measuring inequality by 
conceptualizing poverty and inequality around the notion of social progress. 
Because of the conceptual ambiguity of inequality the questions we ask must 
address which aspects of it matter and what exactly should be focused on in the 
context of sustainable development, and how to turn these questions into concrete 
programmes or state structures that would effectively address inequalities. It seems 
profoundly unfair to expect the development actors to deliver on the SDGs as closing 
the global gap between the rich and the poor is highly dependent on a wide array 
of political choices available to the states. Importantly here, inequality in its various 
forms seems to be the gravest in countries other than LICs. While (North-South) 
development cooperation has been mainly concerned with inequalities between 
countries, an increase in within-country inequalities in a large number of states 
across the world including the Nordic welfare states, has been the sinister reality since 
the 1990s (Bourgoignon, 2015: 33). What to do about the “new bottom billion”4 in 
the MICs is among others, an instrumental question, as it legitimately challenges the 
current international system and the current common understandings of dividing 
4 “Bottom Billion” was originally launched by Paul Collier (2007), with which he refers to 
the billion poorest people in the least developed countries. More recently, Andy Sumner 
(2012b) has suggested the notion of “New Bottom Billion”, referring to increasing 
numbers of poor people at risk of being left without assistance in middle income 
countries. These concepts will be discussed in the following chapter.
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elements of the world: countries that depend on financial support for climbing out of 
poverty; the LICs, and other countries that are less dependent on external funding but 
continue to struggle with poverty and the related problems because of other factors. 
This applies to a good number of countries in the MIC category (Sumner, 2016).
In summary, inequalities in different forms are both a cause and an effect of 
poverty, and economic and social dimensions of inequality are distinct, although 
entwined in multifaceted ways. In general, economic inequality has increased 
the risk of leaving people behind, which has created a range of social challenges 
from polarization and growing resentment towards globalization, to deprivation 
of individuals’ choices and opportunities (Faux & Michel, 2000; Ostry, Berg & 
Tsangarides, 2014). In poverty reduction development assistance is only one part of 
the story, in which Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) through differentiated 
cooperation that extends development outcomes to other relevant sectors is equally 
important. To that end, increased openness (of national economies) to international 
trade, foreign direct investment and capital flows, and the consequent shifting of 
poverty and capital concentration, have forced many traditional Western donors to 
critically assess the ways they interact with the rest of the world. This discussion has 
been enfolded in the demand for more contextualised and therefore more flexible 
and tailor-made aid that is allegedly more responsive to the needs of the recipient. 
Tailor-made aid – also including the transition periods from aid to other forms of 
partnerships, has been mainly justified by: 
−	 A needed update on the cooperation modalities that better reflect the partner’s 
economic status (the “MIC” argument); 
−	 Changes in partnerships related to changes in international cooperation (the 
“political/power” argument); 
−	 The pressure to achieve more value for money and more effective development 
outcomes (the “efficiency” argument); and 
−	 Shared responsibilities of the protection of shared resources (“the global public 
goods” argument) with cooperation beyond development assistance. 
Aid and the transition in emerging economies: the 
“MIC” argument
The new MICs are in the spotlight during these debates for many reasons. The number 
of LICs has reduced significantly; since the 2000s, it has roughly halved (The World 
Bank, 2019), as more countries have moved into the MIC category, and, as already 
stated, many donors have ceased their support to MICs arguing that the countries 
have the resources needed to deal with their poverty problems. These newer MICs, 
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about forty in number, are what Sumner calls “bounce back”, “premature” or “genuine” 
MICs according to their economic development (Sumner, 2016: 14). While indeed 
from an economic point of view they offer emerging, lucrative markets for the rest 
of the industrialized countries, from a social and environmental justice viewpoint 
it is crucial that they get resource distribution right in order to reduce the risk of 
widening income, socio-cultural, rights and access to resource gaps between their 
citizens. As numerous inequality researchers have argued, economic growth has not 
solved problems related to social cohesion; and what the role of other countries is in 
building social cohesion in the process of the emerging economies’ integration into 
world markets is the key piece of the debate. Central to the discussion on whether or 
not to continue development cooperation with MICs, and in particular countries that 
up till quite recently were LICs and are therefore still fragile in many ways, is whether, 
and if so how, inequality is treated as an accredited form of poverty problem. 
In many of the newer MICs, including countries such as Colombia and Ecuador, 
the way inequality is treated as part of the poverty reduction agenda affects those 
countries’ prospects for international support. Scholars have put forward strong 
arguments for continued support for the “new bottom billion” in the poverty pockets 
in the MICs. Indeed, the large number of poor people in the MICs form today’s most 
frequently debated grey area in international cooperation for poverty reduction 
(cf. Sumner, 2012). It is also one of the central concerns of the SDGs, (themselves 
a consensus agenda and the result of a long and careful “grinding” of the needs into 
one document that would be acceptable to most of the countries in the world), which 
attempt to address the problem of unequal resource distribution in a way no other 
international development agenda has done in the past. 
Development assistance and the “political power” 
argument
Sociological research tradition has assumed that “development” is a somewhat linear 
process for which the Western countries provide a legitimate model. The notion 
of development has become loaded with the dichotomy between “traditional” and 
“modern”, in which development represents the imaginary ideal and therefore an 
objective of modernity. In this setting the donor has been considered as holding 
significant power over the beneficiary – usually Third World elites − who, by accepting 
the imposed development model, gain both development assistance and foreign 
investments, which in turn serve as channels to import Western values (Ogujiuba & 
Jumare, 2012: 53). In broad terms, the research has also assumed that collaboration 
between (developing and developed) countries leads to positive development 
outcomes – presumably primarily in Southern developing countries − and that 
development indeed requires external interventions. (Trigilia, 2002: 155). Today, we 
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are not only questioning the roles and the legitimate types of economies and their 
contributions to what we perceive as development in different contexts around the 
world, but the global North has also had to adjust to the fact that ideological power 
relations have changed as countries outside of the traditional Northern hemisphere 
have gained more economic power. For the global poverty reduction agenda this has 
meant a considerable change to donor-recipient relations. 
How the old powers capitalize on emerging forms of collaboration, such as South-
South and triangular cooperation, is an important factor as emerging economies 
that are now also emerging donors offer a competitive option for partnerships 
compared to the traditional donors. Their attractiveness derives both from the 
ideological and methodological alternatives that the Southern partners offer. They 
often fundamentally reject the donor-aid recipient idea, and thereby form equally 
beneficial partnerships free from political ties (Woods, 2008; Zimmermann & Smith, 
2011), in comparison to, for example, the EU, which is notorious for the weight 
which its support puts on partners in form of conditionalities (cf. Khanna, 2007; 
Schmidt, 2012; Fioramonti & Poletti, 2008). Also, while the traditional Western 
donor community fears a range of possible pitfalls in South-South cooperation (See 
Woods, 2008, for a summary of such concerns), there has been less discussion of the 
common socio-cultural understandings that South-South partners may have in turn. 
To give and to give up: the “global public goods” 
argument 
Global public goods and challenges (GPGCs) were introduced to the international 
development agenda by UNDP in the 1990s, and were received with considerably 
mixed enthusiasm by the international community.5 The initial reluctance concerned 
both the definition of GPGCs (and by the way, how they should be linked to 
development), and the financing of GPGCs – whether it should have been in 
addition to or part of the ODA. Entering the SDG and Post-Paris Agreement era 
has demonstrated that the international community has solved some of these initial 
concerns at least at the political level, and those who doubt the often harmful effects 
of globalization on GPGCs if they are not jointly protected, are by now a minority. 
In the case of countries transiting from development aid to other types of 
partnerships, one of the arguments for continued support has been the persistently 
5 Global public goods are defined as “1) natural global commons, such as the ozone layer 
or climate stability; 2) human-made global commons, such as scientific and practical 
knowledge, principles and norms, the world’s common heritage, and transnational 
infrastructures (Internet); 3) global conditions, such as peace, health, and financial 
stability … to be considered public a good must be non-excludable … and non-rival in 
consumption.” (Carbone, 2007b: 181-2).
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fragile governance of scarce resources. Furthermore, especially in the case of Latin 
America, the pleas for continued development funding have been influenced by the 
challenge of striking a balance between foreign investments for national growth 
and development, and the criticism of the extractivist behaviour of multinational 
corporations (North & Grinspun, 2016; Burchardt & Dietz, 2016). In search of 
possible solutions ever since discussions on the Tobin tax (a currency transaction 
tax) accelerated in the 1970s (Carbone, 2007), there have been frequent but 
inconclusive discussions on the need for different international, regional and national 
taxes to alleviate the effects of international trade on local communities and their 
environments. These have been backed by international NGOs, and above all from 
Oxfam, as well as the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) which has 
proposed an international financial transaction tax (FTT) in line with these demands 
from NGOs. 
International taxes, however, also require well-functioning national tax systems, 
which is in fact one of the challenges identified in developing economies. Hence, 
they would probably benefit from external assistance with more effective domestic 
resource mobilization which is needed for both financing public services and for 
taking appropriate measures to protect public goods. In other words, global, regional 
and national FTTs require adequate national and international infrastructure for 
their governance. 
The second issue concerns political decision-making for the re-distribution of 
tax revenues. Where additional revenues are invested is a question of both political 
choices and national sovereignty in order to make those choices. While the general 
assumption might have been that international taxes would automatically help to 
preserve the GPGCs and generate more money for development assistance, there 
are no guarantees that this would be the case. Also, some critics have suggested that 
more tax revenues channelled to more development assistance would lead to tax cuts 
in recipient countries, thus the primacy must lie in strengthening income taxation 
of the elites (Clist, 2016). On the other side, some not only reject the negative effect 
of development assistance in the recipient countries’ tax bases, but suggest a modest 
positive effect (Ibid.). 
Value for ODA: the “efficiency” argument
The argumentation that defends ODA (see Appendix 2 for a full definition of ODA) as 
a tool primarily for the LICs is rooted in Paul Collier’s influential study “The Bottom 
Billion”. One of Collier’s main conclusions is that as overall prosperity in the world 
has increased, the billion poorest people in the poorest countries have continued to 
fall deeper into poverty, and hence are in need of ODA resources more than the rest 
of the world (Collier, 2007: 11). Also Dollar, Kleineberg and Kraay’s (2013) results of 
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the study on the impact of economic growth on the poorest in relative terms support 
Collier’s arguments. For the LDCs, ODA, which has steadily increased globally in 
the past decades, is indeed still a major source of external financing – on average 
70 per cent of it. The MICs on the other hand have lost considerable amounts of 
ODA resources as more donors have focused their ODA on the poorest countries. 
However, in many MICs the ODA continues to play an important role in the provision 
of technical support, knowledge and technology transfer, and essential public goods. 
(OECD, 2017). 
The priority need of ODA in LDCs is unquestionable, however, the efficiency 
argument; spending development funding where it can have most results, is often 
advanced without much contemplation of what efficiency is and how to measure 
the results. In the specific case of the MICs, it is also problematic, if not impossible, 
to establish what the pace and the level of progress towards the SDGs would be 
with continued donor support as opposed to closing development cooperation and 
thereby fully financing the same with national resources. In other words, efficiency 
requires a consensus on both what is considered efficient in a given setting, and how 
to measure it. The notion of efficiency in development metrics should entail working 
towards development results against globally and locally agreed objectives, and 
should include managing money transparently and preferably without losing it on its 
way to the intended targets. Therefore the discontinuation of development funding 
can lead to the creation of sectoral or issue-based funding deficits, which in turn can 
lead to an acceleration of other problems, such as exhaustion of natural resources in 
the MICs. On the other side, the “aid darlings” can experience absorption capacity 
problems. Both cases demonstrate inefficiency problems of some sort, whether 
directly or indirectly counted as inefficiency in development.
Efficiency also entails accountability, and the SDGs leave some open questions 
about who is accountable to whom. The SDGs are not only development goals. They 
present the ideal world order from which each nation should benefit − a world which 
in all likelihood would not have quite the same economic or political governance 
system we have today. These sorts of unresolved issues are present for example in the 
new measures of ODA, such as the Total Official Support for Sustainable Development 
(TOSSD) statistics framework of the OECD. TOSSD is designed to also cover private 
funding for development mobilized through official means (OECD, 2017). This gives 
agency to more actors in the field of development, and thereby raises the question of 
who these actors must be accountable to their actions – states, international bodies 
or the beneficiaries? 
The SDGs and the related new measures reflect the difficulties of transition 
periods: we are aware of the need for enacting change but we are pursuing it within 
the structures already familiar to us. As some suggest what we in reality lack is a global 
governance model that would support more equal wealth distribution worldwide 
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(cf. Stiglitz, 2009). The lack of such a model is allegedly one of the main challenges 
facing global taxation as well. A global structure would possibly allow efficiency 
for development to be defined in more elaborate way. Also new alternative (instead 
of mere GDP/GNI based) metrics encompassing the social, natural and economic 
assets and liabilities of a state within the confines of social and planetary limits may 
establish efficiency in a meaningful way within the framework of global sustainable 
development. These models aspire to bring as many voices to the defining of targets 
for inclusive and sustainable development in different contexts, and provide models 
for identifying present and alternative paths to “safe and just space for humanity” 
(Leach, Raworth & Rockström, 2013, 86−87). 
The origin of the efficiency argument − the pressure to show that the money is 
well spent − is particularly dominant among the old donors; the OECD members, 
who have provided development aid from public financing. Especially the European 
Commission, which is financed by its Member States, has been pushed to show 
more results in ODA spending and to continuously justify the added value of 
institutional development cooperation. In that context grants-loan blending for 
example is considered to be an efficient way of leveraging development funding in 
partnerships with the private sector. The division of labour for blending principles 
is clear: governments are to create enabling business environments with supporting, 
solid regulatory frameworks, and, at the same time to provide seed money, while 
the private sector can bring substantial leverage to the task. However, efficiency for 
the EU in this context is no doubt measured differently than it would be by a private 
sector counterpart, which is still primarily looking for financial profits. On the 
other hand, efficiency in some emerging economies might be measured in different 
ideological terms altogether. Some regimes may consider post-capitalist models, 
which are becoming increasingly popular research topics, and which emphasize 
sustainable communities models over the market economy (cf. Gibson-Graham, 
2006). Where such models are actively being discussed, like-mindedness becomes an 
efficiency factor in achieving common objectives.
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5. Tailor-Made Aid for Effective 
Cooperation: the Anatomy 
of Differentiation
Sociologists have associated structural differentiation in its traditional sense 
with modernization processes, which indeed have been treated as processes of 
“development” by those who have understood them as a change from traditional 
societies to modernity. One significant feature of modernization has been the 
formation of state structures as opposed to governing systems based on religion or 
kin. For Parsons and many other structural functionalists, differentiation essentially 
happened as a natural by-product of modernization. Parsons has also discussed the 
notion of ranking as a fundamental element of social systems, and which individuals 
use to categorize and evaluate their social surroundings (Parsons, 1964: 70). As for 
economic systems, Parsons and Smelser (1956) considered them as functionally 
differentiated sub-systems of a society. Differentiation in development cooperation 
entails elements of these classical definitions: it is an artefact of specialization and 
an outcome of a set of relative considerations and ranking which takes place by 
evaluating different factors against one another in interactive processes of weighing 
interests, roles and the specific goals attached to them (Parsons, 1964). 
Then how to differentiate for the best, tailor-made outcomes of poverty 
reduction? For development scholars, differentiation primarily stands for the 
distinct selection of the levels of resources, types of instruments, the choice of actors, 
and the length and the scope of chosen interventions (Freres, 2003). Differentiation 
may be also understood as a more facilitative concept, in which case the analytical 
interest lies on places, sectors and arenas of development and what needs to happen 
in them in order to improve the material and cognitive well-being of an individual 
(cf. Gupta & Vegelin, 2016: 436). Taking a more problem-oriented view, Yamey 
et al. (2016) suggest both temporal and spatial approaches to the conceptual 
development of differentiation. Examining Swedish development assistance for 
the health sector, they propose two-track strategies divided into global and local 
functions with a view that the (local) beneficiaries will build their own capacities 
in order to take over within a given timeframe. What makes their work particularly 
interesting and potentially translatable to horizontal pro-poor development and 
welfare planning, is the proposed combination of actions that regard certain health 
issues as global public goods with potentially grave local effects which accordingly 
require cross-national management and should therefore be subject to continuous 
36
Riina Pilke
international support. As for local functions, they propose a strategic approach to 
distinguish “replaceable” and “less replaceable” local functions, such as support to 
vulnerable groups (Ibid.:137).
Differentiation as the EU’s operational principle
Turning specifically to the EU, the institution has increasingly emphasized a 
differentiated approach to development in its recent policy documents. While it has 
altered the original meaning of structural differentiation, it has maintained both its 
ideological roots and an instrumental aspect of it. The EU defines differentiation in 
development cooperation as follows:
“Implementation of Community development cooperation is 
necessarily country or region-specific, ‘tailor-made’ to each 
partner country or region, based on the country’s own needs, 
strategies, priorities and assets. Differentiation is a necessity, 
given the diversity of partners and challenges… Development 
objectives are goals in their own right. Development 
cooperation is one major element of a wider set of external 
actions, all of which are important and should be coherent, 
mutually supportive and not subordinate to each other.” 
(European Union, 2006: 10) 
Since this definition there have been some additional conceptual developments on 
differentiation. The element of tailor-made action is still present in the EU’s later 
policy texts, but differentiation has evolved into primarily a device for the distribution 
of development funding, and should thus be subject to debate on whether it should 
be targeted to poor people or poor countries (see also Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). 
The Agenda for Change of 2011 establishes that “a differentiated EU approach to aid 
allocation… is key for achieving maximum impact and value for money” (European 
Commission, 2011a: 9). 
Evidently differentiation is a more complex issue than simply which countries 
development assistance goes to, and certainly levels of funding per se do not add up 
as differentiation in development cooperation. Rather, they become differentiated 
when one beneficiary or sector receives more as a result of another one losing. As 
such, differentiation as an EU policy approach entails the already debated question of 
whether development assistance should be targeted to poor people or poor countries 
(Sumner, 2010; Verbeke & Renard, 2011; Koch, 2015; Sumner, 2016). In recent 
years, generally speaking, the EU has responded to the pressure to channel more 
development assistance to LDCs in Africa in respect for the Cotonou Agreement 
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and the subsequent Africa-EU strategy (cf. Holland, 2008), which has consequently 
reduced development funding in other parts of the world. 
The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) identifies 
three modalities of differentiation that are typical of European Commission 
development cooperation: 1) a differentiated mix of policies and instruments; 2) 
differentiated levels of development assistance; and 3) differentiated eligibility of 
development cooperation (ECDPM, 2012: 5-6). To this definition, which is in fact 
relevant beyond the EU, we should also add differentiated conduits of cooperation 
including bilateral and multilateral partnerships, and triangular cooperation models. 
Of these options eligibility for development assistance in particular has been under 
scrutiny in the latest overhaul of the Commission’s financial architecture in the MFF 
2014-2020, whereby eligibility is linked to the process of “graduation” of certain 
countries from development assistance. Importantly, in the EU development policy 
context, graduation is essentially interpreted as becoming non-eligible to ODA as 
defined by the OECD DAC recipient list. 
Differentiation and Policy Coherence for Development
Treating differentiation as an operational principle seems insufficient without discussing 
the notion of PCD in EU development policy. The aim here nevertheless is not to dive 
into the depths of defining PCD in the context of the EU development policy, which is 
well covered by a number of scholars elsewhere: pioneering research has been carried 
out by Forster and Stokke (1999), who have laid the foundations for the conceptual 
understanding of PCD in the EU policy. Their work has been followed by a number of 
other researchers, including Koulaïmah-Gabriel (1999), Holland (2002), and Carbone 
(2008), who have all deeply contributed to both a conceptual and a process-based 
analysis of PCD. Suffice to state here, therefore, that EU development policy is tightly 
inter-linked with other policy areas of the Union, such as security and trade, which 
should all be facilitated for synergies through the EU’s policy coherence approach. To 
that end, if development assistance with the current system to account for ODA alone 
does not allow enough flexibility to facilitate tackling multi-dimensional development 
challenges, PCD is one approach that is fit to do so (Koch, 2015: 487). Relevant here is 
how PCD ought to both evolve and facilitate the differentiated partnerships between 
the EU and a number of emerging economies in the SDGs framework. Notably, while 
the pioneering “first phase” of PCD research has largely focused on the relationship 
between development policy and the EU’s trade (and security) policies in the external 
policy framework, the second phase, for which there is only a modest amount of research 
to date (see for example Siitonen, 2016), should bridge the divide between internal and 
external policies, and assess the consequences of potentially harmful practices of the 
EU in developing and emerging economies. 
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Particularly in the context of the EU’s differentiation principle PCD entails the 
diversification of policy objectives in a given partnership rather than the eradication 
of one of them. To that end Gupta and Vegelin (2016), for example, argue that a 
genuinely inclusive approach and putting the SDGs at the heart of the EU together 
entail adequate ecological, social and political grounds for sustainable development 
in developing and emerging economies, something which will not be achieved 
without the developed countries giving something up (Gupta & Vegelin, 2016: 
445) and thereby accurately demonstrating the contemporary socio-economic and 
political paradoxes. Similarly, Stiglitz notes on the post- US financial crisis period 
that hopefully it will lead to a more global change of policies and ideas: 
“If we make the right decisions, not merely the politically or 
socially expedient ones, we will not only make another crisis less 
likely, but perhaps even accelerate the kinds of real innovations 
that would improve the lives of people around the world.” (Stiglitz, 
2009: xiii).
In order to be successful in such a task, it is necessary to assess the way the EU 
formulates its internal policies, in which European interests are placed at the core. 
To that end, it is also worth briefly discussing the idea of free markets that sets the 
foundations of the current global trade system. Economic sociologists examine the 
very idea of free markets by approaching economies as systems of markets and social 
structures (Block & Evans, 2005; Swedberg, 2005). As such, markets are just one part 
of an economic organization whereby different actors take up different roles according 
to their motives and interests, and in order to find and secure their respective niches 
(cf. Swedberg, 2005; White, 1981). Furthermore, markets are processes resulting 
from social relations that involve competition, calculation, struggles for power and 
control and even conflict (Lie, 1997; Swedberg, 2003: 120) in an arena for corporatist 
behaviour on the one hand and state interventions on the other (Lie, 1997). 
Many scholars have concluded that there is no real incentive for EU Member 
States to apply the notion of PCD, but that instead the EU’s economic and security 
interests continue to dominate partnerships (cf. Hurt, 2010). Indeed, applying PCD 
rigorously would also mean more regulation of trade relations, and likely not to the 
economic benefit of the EU. This in general terms disputes the basic principles of 
capitalism, which are considered to represent “the highest degree of market freedom” 
(Weber, 1978: 82-83). Consequently, researchers in the field will have a new, extended 
agenda − less because of the SDGs themselves and more because of the reasons for 
the states to agree on them. As discussed previously, poverty is no longer a problem 
solely of developing economies as richer countries not only struggle with unequal 
wealth distribution amongst their own citizens but are now also obliged to answer 
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the moral questions of uneven wealth distribution between rich and poor countries. 
These discussions bring us to two main considerations: whether de-regulation is an 
illusion altogether, and whether actors in the market are willing to change the system 
by giving up some of their own interests. Concerning the former, Weber posits 
that even if markets are said to be free, they must still be rational and predictable, 
which inevitably requires regulation, whether it is traditional, conventional, legal, or 
through voluntary action driven by interests (Ibid.). In the same spirit, Fligstein and 
Stone Sweet question the idea that economic growth depends on free markets and 
thereby de-regulation (Fligstein & Stone Sweet, 2002). As for the latter, the existence 
of free markets has been rejected altogether by Guy Standing, who has made a strong 
case for the damaging effects of “crony” and rentier capitalisms (Standing, 2016).
Policy coherence and the EU single market
Among policy coherence experts, there is a strong tradition of assessing the effect of 
trade policies and practices on developing economies. Similarly, in the EU context, 
the repercussions of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on development 
cooperation have been discussed from many angles by different scholars over the 
past two decades or so. The EU’s tax practices and policy coherence for development 
is still an emerging field that is likely to attract more interest among development 
professionals, given that domestic resource mobilization and blocking loopholes in 
taxation have been identified as one of the crucial global concerns for sustainable 
development. Moreover, while the responsibility of tax havens to play by international 
rules is widely discussed, and several mechanisms have been created for holding them 
accountable, less attention has been given to the ways the EU’s tax good governance 
agenda connects to the notion of responsibility towards third countries. 
If the SDGs are to be placed centre stage as a global sustainability project, then it 
seems highly important to scrutinize the ways the European single market operates in 
relation to third countries. The single market is a product of the neoliberal ideology 
emanating from modern financial markets in the 1980s, when competitiveness 
became the ultimate goal to be achieved and maintained by attracting foreign direct 
investment, and by boosting exports and limiting imports (Standing, 2016). Indeed, 
Fligstein and Stone Sweet (2002) have found that those who have benefited from 
the single market the most are exporting companies. By now the single market 
has evolved into a complex yet relatively stable, self-reinforcing system of national 
and regional governance structures, rules of exchange, property rights − and to an 
increasing extent immaterial and patent rights − which the states facilitate to enable 
the functioning of the European markets (Ibid., 2002). 
Taxation, nevertheless, has been solely a Member-State competence and largely 
ignored in the single market project until quite recently. This does not however mean 
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that taxation has been a neglected area, on the contrary for most Member States it has 
been a pivotal part of their state structures. The Member States’ tax policies were, for 
their part, not subject to cooperation with others, but were subject to mechanisms to 
reinforce the neoliberal ideology. Taxes were used as a tool for competition, mainly 
through lowering corporate taxes and placing relatively heavy burdens of income 
taxes on the citizens (cf. Kemmeren, 2014, Standing, 2016). For example Germany, 
one of the strongest economies in the EU and one of the stoutest defenders of the 
neoliberal ideology, has been defined as a “combination of the principle of market 
freedom with that of social compensation” (Müller-Armack, 1956, in Scharpf, 1996: 
18). 
Even if tax cooperation is expected to deepen in the future, tax cooperation 
to tackle aggressive tax planning and tax evasion nevertheless means a significant 
change of paradigm that is likely to cause “conflict of interests between upholders of 
the old rules and supporters of change” (Trigilia, 2002: 252). It may prove to be an 
impasse in two ways: the first problem concerns the ways different agents organize 
themselves according to their motivations in order to create the right conditions 
for markets à la Fligstein et al. (Fligstein & Merand, 2002; Fligstein & Stone Sweet, 
2002). The second challenge entails the methodological processes that lead to the 
adoption of common rules of action à la Scharpf (1996). According to Scharpf, who 
has analyzed the ways the EU has reached its current form, the EU has benefited 
mostly from negative integration − that is, agreeing on regulatory frameworks at the 
supra-national level primarily by removing certain national rules that have acted as 
barriers to the Member States (Ibid.). Achieving positive integration is problematic, 
as it entails putting joint regulations (which often mean restrictions and obligations 
for individual members) in place, which depends on both national decision-making 
and thereafter on a unanimous agreement at a supra-national level (Ibid.). Taxation 
inescapably involves positive integration, and it cannot promise economic gains 
similar to the single market. In fact, corporate tax cooperation involving more state 
control contradicts to an extent the idea of free markets, in which generally minimum 
state interventions is preferred.
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6. Research Questions, Data 
and Methodology
Research problem and questions
The aim of this study is to examine how the EU’s development cooperation accommodates 
the need to address poverty and inequalities in the MICs, where of great concern is the 
formation of poverty pockets owing to high levels of inequality as the countries’ overall 
economic situations improve. The study proceeds from the differentiation principle, 
which has been discussed in more general terms in the previous chapters, and which 
is applied in the EU’s development cooperation. As stated earlier, differentiation has 
been applied in nineteen countries during the MFF 2014-2020: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Maldives, Malaysia, Kazakhstan and Thailand. The study 
is founded on two specific arguments: it is reasonable to assume that an operational 
decision to apply differentiated cooperation is 1) backed up by political and strategic 
visions of mutually beneficial post-development partnerships (including the option 
of non-collaboration as well) that are compatible with international development 
frameworks, and 2) implemented according to shared conceptual understandings of 
differentiation. The research questions can be summarized as follows:
RQ1 Is the EU’s differentiated approach compatible and coherent with its 
development cooperation objective of poverty eradication?
I specifically focus on investigating how operationalization of differentiation fits into 
the EU’s commitments to PCD, and how coherent differentiation strategy is with the 
relevant financial instruments.
RQ 2 What are the EU definitions of poverty and inequality and how do they 
interrelate within the EU’s differentiated cooperation framework?
Here it has been relevant to shed light on the ways the Commission has operationalized 
its policy objectives for poverty reduction under the MFF 2014-2020, and what the 
criteria for applying differentiation in certain MICs were.
RQ 3 What kind of other approaches, apart from differentiation, could the EU 
apply in MICs in order to reduce inequalities and marginalization? For 
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example, in the SDG framework, what role has taxation to play in social 
development in partnerships between the MICs and the EC? 
Given the increased focus on tax-related good governance in the EU in the recent 
years, I have anchored my analysis to the Commission’s Platform for Tax Good 
Governance. To that end, I have examined the institutional conditions under which 
the Platform has to sustain its operations, and the ways different institutions’ actors 
affect the Platform’s functionality. 
The research questions have been taken up chronologically in each of three 
research articles. The main aspects of the articles are summarized as follows: 
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Research Data
The data set, which consists of the EU’s official documents and interview data of 
11 Commission officials, is the result of a gathering process that has stretched over 
several years, first as a practicing policy analyst and an advocate, then as a researcher. 
The documents, which have been used as data and which are listed in Appendix 1, 
are generally but not strictly limited to the Post-Lisbon era from 2010 onwards. From 
an analytical point of view, a significant period has been from 2012 to 2015, when 
the Commission first negotiated, and then began to implement, the MFF 2014-2020, 
which entailed new programmes with third countries for the next seven year period. 
The data set has been selected on both a thematic and a geographical basis. It 
consists of documents that establish past and future cooperation in the countries 
subject to a differentiated approach to development. These include both country-
specific and general strategies which one way or another address MICs as a distinct 
category for partnerships. As for the thematic focus of the documents in the data 
set, since development cooperation was the main modality of cooperation in the 
focus countries in the past, and since the differentiation principle primarily affects 
development cooperation, the EU’s development policies and a number of policy 
communications that further elaborate on specific issues referred to in the EU’s 
development policy are the point of departure of the analysis. The communications 
form a crucial part of the analysis, as they further elaborate on the EU’s thinking 
on a certain topic, and may offer clues about the institutional ways of working. In 
addition, the EU’s post-MDG, or more accurately the Agenda 2030 policy statements 
and strategic documents, are an important part of the analysis and relevant to the 
formulation of new partnerships between the MICs and the EU. 
Other horizontal policy guidance has been analysed where relevant. Examples 
include communications on equality, human rights, and policies concerning the 
single market and taxation. Furthermore, as one of the key objectives of this study is 
to examine how policy turns into operations, I have also examined work programmes 
and staff working documents that are of relevance to the polices being investigated 
as well as regulations covering key financial instruments. Moreover, in order to 
include relevant aspects of the decision-making processes, I have reviewed Council 
conclusions when development, tax good governance issues, or related budgetary 
matters have been on the agenda of the European Council. 
Lastly, while policy documents form the main body of data, the interviews that I 
carried out in Brussels served as important complementary sources of information. 
The interviews, which were carried out in October 2015, served two purposes: 1) to 
gather additional, unpublished information (such as impending policy elaborations) 
on how and where differentiation was applied, on tax good governance and its 
linkages to differentiation and SDGs; and 2) to further investigate the internal 
working processes in the Commission.
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Nodal points and the floating signifier
Common to all research articles is the interpretation of the political discourse of the EU’s 
policy and legal documents, assuming that the EU aims to achieve, and is committed to 
the achievement of, the SDGs. It should be stressed, though, that this study is not only 
placed in the domain of development policy, but has as an objective the assessment 
of how the SDGs, with their single most important goal i.e. poverty eradication in all 
settings, guide the EU in more horizontal terms; across policy divides. To that end, 
the third article focuses chiefly on a complementary or even alternative approach to 
development assistance; tax good governance after the differentiation principle has 
been applied, whereas differentiation is both a central common denominator and a 
dependent variable for the two former articles. Differentiation alone, however, is not 
in and of itself susceptible to analysis; it is only given a meaning through the discourse 
and practice in which it is used. In order to be a meaningful part of development 
discourse, it must be examined within such a discursive environment. In the EU 
policy framework this should be easy if one focuses only on policy documents that 
are clearly labelled as “development policy”. However, given the complex policy 
environment that the EU is, the challenge is to draw “a meaningful whole” from the 
various policy communications that address problems relevant to development and 
poverty reduction in Europe and in third countries.
The research problem is a practical one, but in an attempt to construct a full 
picture of differentiation as a policy and operational approach, the articles draw from 
the long-standing structuralist research tradition by borrowing the idea of “nodal 
points” and a “floating signifier” in discourse analysis (cf. Mehlman, 1972; Johnson, 
1993). As Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) explain,
“…discourse theory has a term for those elements which are 
particularly open to different ascriptions of meaning, and that is 
floating signifiers (Laclau 1990: 28, 1993b, 287) [as quoted in in 
Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 28]. Floating signifiers are the signs 
that different discourses struggle to invest with meaning in their 
own particular way.” (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 28)
While floating signifiers may also be “nodal points”, for analytical purposes of this 
study I consider differentiation as a floating signifier, as its utilization as an operational 
device depends on the type of the cooperation in a given situation. Poverty, inequality, 
policy coherence for development, and tax good governance function as nodal points for 
the EU’s overall approach to development. While there are good arguments for other 
kinds of methodological distinctions as well, such a conceptual division of labour 
makes sense for the purposes of limiting the data to relevant official documents for 
this analysis.
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The chosen nodal points (i.e. poverty, inequality, policy coherence for development 
and tax good governance) that I have considered as critical pillars in EU development 
policy also reflect recent global development policy reforms. It should be noted, 
however, that while the notions of poverty, policy coherence for development and 
tax good governance are concepts that the EU has defined as its central concerns, 
the perception of inequality is more ambivalent, and the EU has not considered 
inequality to be a problem in its own right up until now. In other words, it does not 
have explanatory strategic visions for inequality as a distinct development challenge, 
in the way it has for resilience in poverty reduction, for example. In spite of this, 
there are plenty of policy statements that recognize and respond to the problems that 
inequalities create.
As the first step in the analysis I have gathered policy and legal documents of 
the EU that address and define the EU’s understanding, role and assumed actions in 
relation to the nodal points (particularly poverty and inequality), initially simply by 
searching for them in the texts. In order to ensure the inclusion of as many relevant 
documents as possible, I have also searched policy documents that define the same 
as antonyms: in pursuit of equality or equity. I have then added policy coherence for 
development as a nodal point for the purposes of widening the scope of the analysis 
from what is traditionally considered as development policy or cooperation to other 
policy domains.
Research Method
Differentiation is a central axiom that gives meaning to both overall policy 
deliberations and operational direction in relation to the chosen nodal points. From 
an analytical point of view, this is a key distinction. On one hand differentiation sets 
out political direction and a strategy for better targeted development interventions 
according to the needs of the partner while on the other, it serves as functional 
guidance for operational decisions with significant ramifications for the partner. The 
former aspects are discussed particularly in the article Inequality and poverty: The ill-
fitting pieces in the EU’s development partnerships (Pilke & Stocchetti, 2016), whereas 
the article Partnerships in transition: the case of the EU and middle-income countries 
(MICs) (Pilke, 2016) focuses on the latter. Both analyses are grounded in Norman 
Fairclough’s idea that discourse both produces and changes social knowledge 
(Fairclough, 1992).
According to Fairclough (1993), three dimensions can be identified in a 
discourse: 1) language use as social practice; 2) the kind of language used in a given 
social context; and 3) the ways language is used from different social perspectives. I 
examine differentiation both as a policy text and as a discursive practice (Jorgensen 
and Phillips, 2002: 68). The latter, it should be noted, both consumes and reproduces 
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meanings. Laclau and Mouffe argue that political articulations determine how we act, 
think and thereby create society (in Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 45). Differentiation 
was originally created as a political concept mainly to allow flexibility to define 
partnerships in different contexts, but it has thereafter been given various meanings 
which have led to different institutional practices, depending on who is utilizing the 
principle.
Once the initial selection of data according to the chosen nodal points was 
completed, I then moved on to investigating how and in which contexts differentiation 
is used in the documents, dividing the analysis into two parts: a) differentiation as 
a political message (corresponding with aforementioned Fairclough’s analytical 
distinction of discourse as a social practice and the forms it has taken in different 
contexts); and b) differentiation as an operational approach (corresponding with 
Fairclough’s idea of the ways language is used from different social perspectives). 
These two categories were further broken down into functional sub-categories as 
presented below:





Sub-categories 1 Definitions of differentiation
2 Expressions related to the need for differentiation
3 Practical interpretations, implications and criteria
Another key methodological choice that is common to all articles is that they 
approach the research problem linearly, from the production of policy to operations. 
Consequently, the analysis focuses on the processes through which the Commission 
turns policies first into financial instruments, and then, within the scope of the 
instruments, into programming and partnerships with third countries. The 
assumption here is that the different parts of the institution act according to a 
somewhat stern division of labour, and it is well possible – although not necessarily 
always the case – that policies are written without consulting operations, and vice 
versa. 
The problem of inequality in differentiation
The first article (Pilke & Stocchetti, 2016) reviews the EU’s different discursive 
understandings of poverty, inequality and differentiation, and whether they create 
different and antagonistic dispositions to one another (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 
51) in the ways that these understandings are conveyed into practical cooperation. 
We have examined both the evolution of more general policy discourse from inclusive 
development (of the European Consensus for Development of 2006) to inclusive 
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growth and differentiation (of the Agenda for Change of 2011), and reviewed 
definitions and stated consequences of inequality on poverty and on the related 
actions aimed at poverty reduction.
We began by outlining the EU’s legal commitments to development cooperation, 
establishing that the legal framework enables the EU to work simultaneously for 
poverty eradication and the reduction of inequalities. The subsequent analysis was 
anchored to the Agenda for Change (2011), which sets the EU’s basic conceptual 
understanding of differentiation in poverty eradication: “… Country needs: assessed 
using several indicators, taking into account, inter alia, economic and social/human 
trends, and the growth path as well as vulnerability and fragility indicators” (European 
Commission, 2011: 9). This approach has been fruitful, as our assumption was that 
within the EU system those who create policies and those who design programmes 
based on the institution’s policies, may often have less connection between each 
other than might be presumed. Such disconnections constitute different institutional 
realities and discursive competition between competing interests and resources 
internally.
For the purpose of establishing the conceptual relationship between poverty, 
inequality and differentiation in development cooperation, we analysed twelve policy 
communications, staff working documents, and relevant regulations where inequality 
or synonymous and related terminology / phrases had been used. In respect of what 
we have considered as “synonymous” or “related” terminology, the texts or specific 
issues addressed in a policy text must have either referred to the Union’s development 
policies (The European Consensus on Development or the Agenda for Change), or 
to poverty reduction, welfare, and the MDGs in the case of pre-2015 texts, or in the 
post-2015 Agenda; the SDGs. In addition, we have included policies that address 
vulnerability and fragility, and the related stated indicators for measuring them. 
Other sources for the analysis were relevant documents for the functioning of the 
financial instruments and recent publications that were generally considered as key 
policy guidance for external relations. Table 3 in chapter seven lists the reviewed 
policy, staff working documents and regulations. 
Policy coherence for development in differentiation
Following a similar logical path to the first article, the second article (Pilke, 
2016) assesses the ways differentiation is made into an operational concept in the 
Commission and how it thereby fits the EU objectives on PCD. For the EU, PCD is an 
important approach that should cut across the external policy framework, in which 
differentiation represents the “why” in choosing the right mixes of partnerships, while 
PCD signifies the “how” of the same. As such, there has been a noticeable and already 
much researched change, whereby the different parts of the EU’s external policy 
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framework have experienced cross-absorption. In Fairclough’s terms, this refers to an 
increased intertextuality by “bringing other voices into a text”, either in the form of 
citations, or otherwise. In doing so, it brings both differences and relational aspects 
to a narrative (Fairclough, 2003:41). Furthermore, and typical of the EU policy 
environment, there is a high inter-relativity of policy texts, in which understanding 
a single factor requires cross-examination of, and a dialogue between, several policy 
statements. According to Fairclough, high levels of inter-discursivity is associated 
with high levels of change, whereas low levels are associated with reproducing the 
existing order (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 73). Although assessing the level of change 
is not a focus of this study per se, a blurring of discursive boundaries – and increased 
inter-discursivity – can certainly be observed in the EU. This is evident for example 
in the EU’s trade policy of 2015. Therefore it is both interesting and worthwhile to 
examine the notion of PCD in the process of differentiation, i.e. a shift from one form 
of partnership to another.
I examine different conceptual understandings of PCD and differentiation, 
departing from the assumption that differentiation, which is vaguely defined in 
policy texts, allows both re-production and re-creation of social practices within 
the institution in a two-way process. I investigate the discursive change paths that 
can be identified first in policy formulation, e.g. production of discourse, and then 
by the practitioners in programming, which are the consumers and re-producers 
of discourse (Fairclough 1992). In the case of the MICs, the article underscores an 
important shift in discourse away from traditional development cooperation (with 
an imbalanced interest and power set-up between the partners), towards interests 
in mutually (often economically) beneficial and hence presumably more equally 
leveraged partnerships.
As a final step in analysing and describing the evolution of the two concepts in 
focus here from political narrative to programming, I utilize the notions of vertical 
and horizontal coherence introduced by Mauricio Carbone (2008). Vertical 
coherence in this case refers to the European Commission’s intra-organizational 
processes, and specifically how development cooperation and the relevant country 
strategies matched the design of two relevant financial instruments in the light 
of differentiation. The article examines horizontal and vertical coherence in 
three functional dimensions: 1) horizontal policy coherence for development 
and differentiation between different foreign policy niches, 2) operationalization 
of policy from the top (politics) to institutional grass roots (operations and 
programming); and 3) consistency and complementarity between the Partnership 
Instrument (PI) and the DCI.
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What comes next? Tax good governance in the EU internal 
markets and in third countries
The third article (Pilke & Räsänen, 2018) examines vertical coherence from policy 
formulation to the operationalization of policies, the interests of the interlocutors, 
and the actions that the different units of the Commission pursue according to 
their own interests. We focused on tax good governance as a nodal point for several 
reasons. Most importantly, tax good governance in both the single market framework 
and in external relations or in the SDGs framework, has gained significant impetus 
within the EU in recent years. To emphasize the importance of taxation as a global 
agenda, the Commission established the Platform for Tax Good Governance in 2013, 
and launched a list of non-cooperative third-country tax jurisdictions in 2015. An 
increased emphasis on tax matters is just as visible in political relations as it is in 
cooperation with third countries. In many countries to which differentiation has been 
applied, the Commission has continued to support – politically or financially – the 
development of good fiscal practices for more efficient tax collection and domestic 
resource mobilization. Particularly in its development policy, the EU considers sound 
tax practices pivotal for poverty eradication. Hence, as the two other articles focus 
on the problematics of transitioning from development cooperation to other types 
of collaboration in a situation where conceptually poverty is also an increasingly 
problematic idea, we have considered the EU’s tax good governance agenda as one of 
the possible solutions that the EU chooses to offer.
The analysis began with a policy review to establish what kind of approaches the 
EU has taken for harmonizing taxation. We focused on examining the EU Platform 
for Tax Good Governance. Given that the Platform was established only in 2013, it 
naturally somewhat limited the analysis mainly to the period between 2013 and 2016. 
However, it should be noted that we reflect the recent changes, under the auspices 
of the tax good governance agenda, to the creation and functioning of the single 
market – which dates back to the 1990’s – and is of great relevance to the demand 
for tax harmonization in the EU. For analytical purposes, methods of political 
mapping have been applied (World Bank, 2007). Through policy and interview data 
analysis, different dimensions of policy and decision-making processes for tax good 
governance within the European Commission were examined. On one axis, there 
are the policy formulation processes including the motivations that lead to certain 
types of policies. On the other, there are the interests of the various parts of the 
Commission, the European Council and the Parliament that pose risks to reforms 
and the effective implementation of new policies. This internal cohesion and intra-
institutional collaboration from policy to operations − similarly to the two other 
articles − has been the main focus of the article.
Our document review was supported by interview data. For semi-structured 
interviews, the Brussels-based informants were chosen by direct contact and by a 
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snowball sample technique on the grounds of whether their respective units were 
thought to be relevant to the research questions. All interviewees had also participated 
in, or otherwise possessed in-depth knowledge of, tax policy developments, the SDGs 
and related programming, and were presumably either affected by, or otherwise 
familiar with. the differentiation principle. This strategy was chosen as a response 
to overcoming the problems associated with finding the right informants from a 
relatively sequestered group of experts (Atkinson & Flint, 2001; Heckathorn, 1997).
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7. Results – Overview of the Research 
Articles
Article 1: Inequality and poverty: The ill-fitting pieces in 
the EU’s development partnerships (Pilke & Stocchetti, 
2016)
Inequality has become an important determinant in international (development) 
politics, but there is a lack of common consensus on what inequality in different 
contexts entails. To highlight the importance of this global discussion, Andy Sumner 
for example asks whether it should be more important to focus on inequality than 
poverty reduction in the shared frameworks for poverty eradication (Sumner 2010). 
This article explored the different definitions of inequality that are used in development 
cooperation and attempted to shed light on the interrelationship between inequality 
and poverty in EU development policy. We did not aim at presenting a full range of 
different definitions, but instead focused on aspects that are relevant to the EU external 
policy framework; poverty and inequality in the light of the differentiated approach 
to development in the nineteen MICs that are the focus of this thesis, and in which 
inequality is identified as being among the greatest development challenges. The main 
aim of the paper was to 1) review the EU’s definitions of inequality and poverty, and 
to 2) investigate how inequality and poverty are, if at all, taken into account in the 
differentiated cooperation between the Commission and the selected MICs.
We conclude that the EU’s development policy, or the external policy framework 
more broadly, is weak in pinning down the interrelationship between inequality and 
poverty. Nonetheless, it would be false to state that inequality, or more appropriately 
inequalities in various forms, would be considered insignificant in the EU external 
policy framework. EU policies approach inequality from dual perspectives: in other 
words, they give consideration to the fight against inequality and the promotion of 
equality either as stated problems or as antonymous routes to the achievment of their 
objective. To that end, and as an overarching standard, the EU underscores principles 
of equality, and rights-based approaches to poverty eradication in the spirit of 
international human rights agreements. Hence, we argue that while inequalities are 
indeed a concern to the EU in its development partnerships, the weakness lies in the 
inability to consider inequality and poverty as different sides of the same coin. This 
leads to a lack of strategic vision in operationalizing an all-encompassing definition of 
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poverty, which is for example described in the first European Consensus (European 
Union, 2006: para 11).6
The interplay between the policy and the financial regulations – or programming 
more generally – is more problematic to pin down than the EU’s approach to poverty 
and inequality, owing to policy texts that are formulated in a way that allows multiple 
interpretations as to how operations could or should be organized. In the context of 
differentiated cooperation, this is most visible when comparing the financial regulation 
of the DCI to the policy statements. While the policy texts consider “multi-dimensional 
aspects to poverty” (European Union, 2006: 3) and a need for a more “comprehensive 
approach to human development” (European Commission, 2011a:7), legislative 
financial regulation limits the cooperation through geographic instruments based on 
the OECD DAC list and the GNI of the country. This generally rules out financial 
assistance for tackling inequalities as a poverty reduction strategy in the MICs.
We also argue that while there are quite clear political manifestos on the need to 
support the MICs in their fight against inequalities, the EU may not have sufficiently 
considered them when it was designing differentiated cooperation at the beginning 
of the MFF 2014-2020. As a strategy, the EU has increasingly allocated funds to LICs 
rather than dealing with poverty and inequality in the MICs. It should be stressed, 
though, that the necessity of focusing development aid on the LICs, and specifically on 
the LDCs, is a generally agreed principle, which we do not contest. However, applying 
differentiation prematurely since the beginning of 2014 left questions on exit strategies 
(from development cooperation) in the countries concerned, which is in contradiction 
to the Paris and Busan principles on aid effectiveness and the EU’s own policy statements 
regarding the need for predictable and long-term support for poverty eradication, as is 
stated in the 2010 communication on tax and development, for example.
Table 3 summarizes EU policy discourses on poverty and inequality and 
gathers the most relevant discourse for our analysis. These have been categorized as 
follows: 1) Legal basis of EU development and the protection of rights; 2) Key policy 
orientations and principles; and 3) the EU’s approach that the EU may utilize for the 
achievement of equality.7 It should be noted that some communications as a whole 
can be considered as strong expressions of equality and equity. This is the case for 
6 The EU published a new development policy The New European Consensus on 
Development, “Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future”, in 2017. Maintaining the overall 
goal of poverty eradication, its format is closer to the European Consensus than the 
Agenda for Change, and expresses the EU’s vision for the implementation of the Agenda 
2030.
7 Here the focus is on the EU as an institutional bilateral partner, hence the stated actions 
in collaboration with or through other international organisations such as the UN are 
excluded. Despite this framing, channeling development funding through strategic 
international partners is an avenue which widens the scope of EU support both in 
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Table 3: Poverty and inequality in EU policy documents
SOURCE LEGAL BASIS POLICY POSITION / KEY EU PRINCIPLES KEY APPROACHES
European Consensus on 
Development 2006
Treaty of the European 
Community Art. 177-181
−	 Poverty relates to human capabilities and requires multi-dimensional 
approach 
−	 Sustainable development entails good governance, human, political, 
economic, social and environmental rights
−	 Development aid for poor people with particular attention to fragile 
states and donor orphans
−	 Increasing financial resources 
−	 Mainstreaming, coordination and complementarity, synergies with other donors 
and private-public partnerships
−	 Conditional general or sector budget support and grants
−	 Contract-based negotiated mutual commitments 
−	 Micro-financing and debt reduction
COM (2012) Agenda 
for Change and Council 
Conclusions for Agenda 
for Change
Treaty of Lisbon, Art. 
208-211 on development 
cooperation and Art. 212-213 
on economic, financial and 
technical cooperation
−	 Poverty elimination imperative for sustainable development
−	 Differentiated support for inclusive and sustainable growth for human 
development
−	 Coherent approach to development, security and poverty, and address 
underlying causes of conflicts
−	 Support for and participation in political dialogues
−	 Support for better access to land, food, water and energy, stronger business 
environment, environmental and social protection, health and education, and 
green technologies 
−	 Conditionality and differentiation
−	 Private-public partnerships
COM (2014) 335 Decent 
Life for All
N/A −	 Sustainable, people-centered development a common, global and 
inter-dependent concern
−	 PCD and a transformational rights-based framework essential to 
address inequalities, equality and equity in all countries
−	 Address income and wealth disparities for more peaceful societies
−	 Duty free and quota free market access for LDCs
−	 Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP+), Aid for Trade and Everything but 
Arms
−	 Science, Technology and Innovation
COM (2012) 446 
Social Protection in 
the EU Development 
Cooperation
Charter of Fundamental 
Rights Art. 34
−	 Comprehensive approach to human development: increase of equity, 
inclusive growth, social cohesion, stability and state accountability
−	 Poverty in MICs; globalization associated with increased social 
polarization
−	 Inclusion of social protection in policy dialogues on tax and development, 
climate change, corporate social responsibility and linking relief, rehabilitation 
and development
−	 Political dialogues, exchanges and collaborative research, technical assistance
COM (2012) 492 on 
the roots of democracy, 
sustainable development 
and Europe’s engagement 
with civil society 
N/A −	 Civil society engagement for stronger democratic processes and 
accountability systems, and better development outcomes
−	 Equity in access to national systems
−	 Promote a conducive environment for structured participation of CSOs
−	 Promote equitable and sustainable growth and stimulate sustainable local 
economic growth 
−	 Support inclusive policy-making and governance 
−	 Support for social economy and the creation of jobs
COM (2012) 586 The EU 
approach on Resilience: 
Learning from Food 
Security Crises
N/A −	 Poorest households the most vulnerable for natural disasters, political 
instability and conflict
−	 Working with vulnerable countries and poorest populations to 
build resilience through multifaceted strategy and a broad systems 
perspective fundamental for poverty reduction
−	  Long-term commitment to building of long-term resilience through multi-sectoral 
support with a focus on prevention and preparedness, for the empowerment of 
vulnerable groups
−	 Promote resilience and inclusion of resilience in humanitarian action plans
−	 Support to food security and disaster risk reduction programmes
COM (2013) 280 on 
empowering local 
authorities in partner 
countries 
N/A −	 Good governance at local level and participation of citizens 
fundamental for sustainable development and poverty reduction
−	 EU cooperation with local authorities particularly where human rights 
violations take place
−	 More balanced distribution of resources linked to social cohesion
−	 Support de-centralization reforms and promote political, administrative and fiscal 
autonomy of local authorities
−	 Budget support (Sector Reform Contracts)
−	 Cross-border cooperation between local authorities in Europe and in partner 
countries; peer-to-peer learning, balanced, equal & long-term partnerships
COM (2010) 163 on tax 
and development
N/A −	 Sustainable provision of public services requires an increase in domestic 
revenue, taxation instrumental for state building and fostering citizenship
−	 Fight illicit financial flows from developing countries for increased 
spending on MDGs & long-term and predictable assistance from donors
−	 Strengthen public financial management (PFM)
−	 Incentives for high tax good governance performers 
−	 Technical cooperation 
Donor coordination & international collaboration
European Council 2012 
human rights framework 
& Toolbox for Rights-
Based Approach
EU Charter on Fundamental 
Rights, European Convention 
on Human Rights, TEU Art. 
21, Regulation establishing a 
renewed DCI Art. 2, 3.8
−	  ‘The EU will speak out against any attempt to undermine respect for 
universality of human rights’ (p. 2)
−	 The implementation of RBA will be progressive as long as donors 
1) respect core obligations, 2) prevent discrimination, 3) avoid 
retrogression, 4) use maximum resources, 5) ensure transparency
−	 Promote culture of human rights in all areas of external action, with particular focus 
on poor and vulnerable groups; fight discrimination; staff training on human rights
−	 Ensure universal access to basic services & human rights in employment and 
social policy
−	 Political dialogues, sanctions and condemnation, and make trade work in a way 
that helps human rights
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example with the communication of 2012 on the engagement with civil society, and 
the 2014 communication Decent Life for All on the EU’s vision for the SDGs. Other 
communications mentioned below have been considered relevant as they make 
direct references to EU treaties, or to them indirectly through other communications, 
thereby forming pieces of the puzzle which fabricates a set of soft and hard law 
commitments to development through poverty and inequality reduction.
Article 2: Partnerships in transition: the case of the EU 
and middle-income countries (MICs) (Pilke, 2016)
Building on the analysis described above, the article aimed to assess differentiation 
in the light of the EU’s commitments to PCD, and how applicable a PCD approach 
is in differentiated cooperation. The analysis focused on the pre-MFF 2014-2020 
era, particularly from the final negotiation period, during which a vivid debate 
between the EU and its stakeholders and partners took place on where and how 
differentiation would be applied, continuing up to 2014-2015 at which point the new 
forms of cooperation took shape under the revised financial instruments. The article 
seeked answers to three specific questions: what where the criteria for the selection 
of certain countries for differentiated cooperation; how compatible these criteria are 
with the EU’s PCD principles; and how coherent the differentiation strategy is with 
the financial instruments through which it is applied. The analysis concludes that the 
Commission seems not to have developed a differentiation methodology that would 
take into accound the PCD approach, despite an apparent need to do so.
The paper is constructed around three analytical dimensions: 1) coherence 
between the EU foreign policy niches; 2) turning the policy texts into operations; 
and 3) coherence between programming, in particular between the PI and the 
DCI. On dimension one, the different political statements were compared with the 
EU’s approach to the SDGs, on which the EU has taken a multi-faceted stance to 
poverty eradication, linked to both universality and differentiation principles. As 
for the notion of universality, the Commission defines it as the achievement of “the 
necessary transformation in all countries at various levels of development” (European 
Commission, 2014a: 3). While the policies emphasize the need for differentiated 
cooperation so as to meet the development needs of the recipients, the operational 
criteria for executing differentiation are formulated in ways that allow the operations 
significant room for manoeuvre according to the needs or even interests of the service. 
Several methodological approaches to differentiation can be identified on the 
basis of EU policy and programming decisions: restricted eligibility (ECDPM, 2012: 
6), which in Commission terms has been referred to as the graduation of countries 
from development cooperation, with assessments based on the human development 
or economic vulnerability indexes (or both), or “other relevant indexes including 
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measuring in-country poverty and inequality” (Official Journal of the European 
Union, 2014a: Art. 3d). Simultaneously, the Commission has expanded ideals that 
have been more familiar to development cooperation to other policy domains such 
as trade. 
Dimension two focuses on the EU’s past (2007-2013) cooperation with the 19 
focus countries, concluding that in most countries poverty eradication or social 
cohesion have been among the main objectives of the Commission’s development 
cooperation. The Commission’s future plans to exit the countries have been visible in 
some cases. As was equally apparent in the country strategies under examination and 
other programming documents, a considerable part of the cooperation has, despite 
its objectives being more social or developmental in nature, focused on reaching 
free-trade agreements or otherwise advancing trade between the EU and the partner 
countries. The analysis also shows that PCD in those partnerships has most often 
boiled down to compatibility with the EU’s rules and procedures, particularly 
with sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and less to coherent programming for 
development as per the EU’s and international definitions of the concept.
While it is problematic to establish the reasons for differentiation in each 
country by means of an analysis primarily of the differentiation criteria and to an 
extent their application, there are clues to these reasons to be found in the strategic 
and policy documents, which at times do not comply with the stated differentiation 
criteria. The Commission has expressed frustration regarding the incompatibility of 
administrative rules of the EU and those of the partner, and a lack of EU political 
leverage with modest allocations to the partner countries. As is also demonstrated, 
the strategic importance of the partner to the EU has influenced funding allocations. 
Most importantly, however, seventeen of the nineteen countries in question are upper 
MICs, and the countries’ economic statuses have naturally played a role in their 
graduation. Despite this, the analysis, supporting other research on the topic, reveals 
that the countries have very varied socio-economic situations, in which inequalities 
hamper the efforts to eradicate poverty.
On the third dimension, two financial instruments relevant to differentiation are 
examined: the PI and the DCI. The PI, a new instrument for advancing European 
interests in its partnerships with third countries, was, during the MFF 2014-2020 
negotiations, often mentioned as a partial answer to the funding gap that the 
graduation of the MICs under the DCI might leave. A closer analysis does indeed 
point to similarities between the instruments when it comes to fostering partnerships 
with third countries, but significant differences on the perspective from which 
partnerships are supported. Another noteworthy difference between the instruments 
is their geographic ranges. Most importantly, while the DCI funds partnerships that 
are based on the needs and rights of the partner, the PI funds initiatives that are of 
European interest. It also seems that the transition from one form of partnership to 
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another has not been particularly well coordinated between the different services 
of the Commission or European External Action Service (EEAS), and therefore the 
transition process has not involved considerations for PCD.
In conclusion, it seems that the way differentiation is operationalized is, at least 
partly, a consequence of weakness in the use of the PCD approach. On dimension 
one – coherence between different policy niches – the PCD approach has been 
increasingly visible in other domains as well as the development domain, and 
conceptually the EU seems to have expanded the scope of PCD from a technocratic 
style (rule compatibility) to an inclusion of more normative elements in line with the 
SDGs. Therefore the problem lies less in the formulation of inclusive and coherent 
policies than in turning these policies into operational strategies and programming.
Obviously, a narrow technocratic interpretation of the PCD approach complies 
only partially with the EU’s development policy aspirations as described in dimension 
one but as such, it has led to conclusions on the inefficient results of cooperation 
due to compliance issues, combined with a feeling that the EU’s political leverage 
is limited in the host countries. A secondary concern, if a concern at all, seems to 
have been the countries’ political, economic or social fragility. By the same token, 
Table 4: Differentiation, policy and operational approaches




•	 Developed and developing countries share 
responsibility for poverty eradication
•	 Support for poverty eradication & pro-poor 
development also in MICs, attention to 
donor orphans
Agenda for Change (2011):
•	 Country needs and capacities
•	 Country commitments and performance
•	 Potential EU effect & leverage
ASSUMED REASONS FOR 
DIFFERENTIATION IN OPERATIONS AND 
PROGRAMMING 
•	 Technocratic approach: rule / administrative 
compatibility of the EU and the partners
•	 Efficiency / inefficiency in achieving results
•	 EU’s political leverage in host countries
•	 Priority focus on economic partnerships
CRITERIA FOR DIFFERENTIATION 
IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
INSTRUMENT 
Country status based on: 
•	 Human Development Index
•	 Economic Vulnerability Index
•	 other indexes such as in-country inequality 
measures
DIFFERENTIATION AND THE 
PARTNERSNIP INSTRUMENT 
•	 No criteria for differentiation, but sets 
a need for a differentiated and flexible 
approach to key partner countries taking 
into account their economic, social and 
political contexts and the EU’s priorities and 
interests
•	 Worldwide scope, but geographic proximity 
to the EU matters
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on dimension three, there seems to have been a limited dialogue among those 
responsible for programming between the compared financial instruments DCI (for 
which DG DEVCO is responsible) and the PI (for which the Service for Foreign Policy 
Instruments, FPI, under the EEAS is responsible), despite their similar thematic 
focuses and partly overlapping geographic scopes. To that end, the main conclusions 
of the article demonstrate challenges in the ways policy objectives are conveyed into 
their respective operational levels; and how, at the operational level, different services 
match their different strategic objectives for differentiated cooperation.
Article 3: Practicing or preaching? Linking taxation and 
sustainable development in EU foreign policy (Pilke & 
Räsänen, 2018)
2015 marked the shift from MDGs to SDGs, suggesting significant ideological and 
operational changes to the ways poverty eradication is achieved globally. Not only do 
the seventeen SDGs present a much wider array of common global concerns than was 
the case with the former MDGs agenda, but they also stress the wide participation 
of actors including the private sector in the joint SDGs project. To that end, the 
division of labour is fairly clear: the role of the state is to protect its citizens, and to 
regulate markets in a way that enables businesses to function globally, and businesses 
should contribute to sustainable growth in a responsible manner – for example in 
accordance with the UN Global Compact. When it comes to the states’ tools for 
regulating markets, taxation is perhaps the most important of them, and boosting 
of domestic resource mobilization for poverty eradication has been agreed upon in 
the “Third Financing for Development” Conference in Addis Ababa. The conference 
resulted in the “Addis Tax Initiative” that takes stock of progress on the Monterrey 
Consensus and the Doha Declaration, and sets goals for aligning financial flows with 
economic, social and environmental priorities as stipulated by the SDGs. As for the 
SDGs, the projected actions on taxation should aim to enhance domestic resource 
mobilization, fight tax avoidance, tax evasion, and (aggressive) tax planning.
As the 2030 Agenda stipulates, poverty eradication is a universal target, and 
its achievement is a globally shared responsibility. The aim of our article was to 
examine recent developments in tax harmonization aimed at attacking aggressive 
tax planning within the EU and in its relations with its partners. We structured 
our analysis around two areas: taxation as a development policy tool for the SDGs; 
and Europe’s protectionism towards European wealth and the single market. A key 
concept to examine was tax good governance, which the EU uses as an overarching 
policy objective, and which entails a range of law and policy initiatives to address the 
problems that lead to tax base erosion. In short, tax good governance equates to paying 
taxes where profit has been made, being transparent and exchanging information, 
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and exercising fair tax competition. These principles are equally applicable, but 
are applied rather differently in practice depending on whether the focus is on EU 
internal or external relations. Exploring the European single market and the ways it 
will integrate different aspects of taxation – which it initially ignored − is nonetheless 
of great importance.
Our findings point to the Commission’s reasonably far-reaching plans to close 
loopholes in taxation for both development outcomes and for more European 
protectionist motives. Nevertheless, the weakness of the EU’s tax agenda thus far, 
from the point of view of global sustainable development, is the absence of efforts 
to join up the work streams related to SDGs and the tax harmonization plans that 
concern the single market. The EU is already working on tackling tax evasion with 
third countries to a certain extent, but not from a perspective that would assess in 
particular the impact of European actors on developing economies – rather the focus 
has been on the efforts to halt tax evasion within Europe. As for instruments of tax 
cooperation, judging by its numerous proposals in recent years the Commission has 
seemingly preferred a tighter regulative approach to tax coordination whereas the 
European Council up until now has essentially favoured a soft law approach. This has 
resulted, unsurprisingly, in quite an imbalanced amount of policy guidance compared 
to only a few legal commitments to fight tax avoidance and evasion. When it comes 
to European companies operating responsibly in third countries (particularly in 
developing economies), next to nothing in the field of tax evasion is has been agreed 
on, underscoring the necessity of finding ways to break the internal-external policy 
divide if the SDGs are to be fully implemented.
Moving on to the institutional level, we anchored our investigation in the 
operations of the Platform for Tax Good Governance, a consultative body steered 
by the Commission with the participation of fifteen representatives of academia, 
trade unions and NGOs. Through the platform, DG TAXUD of the Commission 
consolidates views and puts forward proposals on tax coordination and cooperation. 
We examined how DG TAXUD and the platform collaborate with other DGs and 
with certain parts of the EEAS, and concluded that there is limited collaboration 
between the different institutions; they drive their agendas largely basing them 
on their own, quite possibly differing, interests. The work of DG TAXUD and the 
platform was found to be either irrelevant or even damaging to other DGs in certain 
cases. In the case of the FPI and its Partnership Instrument, which is discussed 
in detail in the first article, its main concern lies in defending European interests 
in third countries – taxation was not one of their focus areas. As for potentially 
conflicting intra-institutional interests, DG TAXUD focuses on fighting tax evasion 
and avoidance, whereas DG Trade’s main concern lies in fighting tax discrimination 
against European companies outside the EU trade area. But perhaps the most striking 
example of intra-institutional conflict is DG TAXUD’s list of non-cooperative tax 
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jurisdictions, a blacklist of countries with harmful tax practices, which was published 
for the first time in 2015. It seems that DG TAXUD has managed the list largely 
in isolation from other services, which have had to deal with political sensitivities 
with the listed partners, in certain cases learning about the list from the partners 
themselves. Also, while the Commission has used naming and shaming tactics to put 
political pressure on third countries, it has not done so in the case of EU members, or 
the ways they take advantage of offshore financial centres.
In the case of DG DEVCO, there is a strong focus on taxation but from the point 
of view of strengthening the aid recipient countries’ own tax collection systems. 
Bilateral development cooperation has focused, in line with the communication 163 
on tax and development, chiefly on the ideals and practices that the Commission 
exports to third countries. DG DEVCO has typically supported the fight against tax 
avoidance through capacity-building for both monitoring illicit financial flows and 
enhancing revenue collection for increased social spending. Importantly here, the 
question of Europeans’ responsibility for paying taxes (also) in third countries, seems 
not be of particular concern.
Another key finding concerns the need for the streamlining of agenda priorities 
in different DGs and the EEAS. Taxation has not been part of the Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) agenda, even if tax good governance would seemingly fit well 
Table 5: Key findings, main challenges for tax collaboration
Key	challenges	for	tax	cooperation
Instrumental Taxation not a joint competence, no regulative powers within the institution
Emphasis on joint guidance and shared responsibilities, not on obligations
Political Taxation a tool to increase economic competitiveness
National sovereignty at stake
Protectionism towards national and/or regional interests
Differing priorities between member states and between the institutional 
actors
Normative Lack of conceptual clarity on the SDGs in relation to taxation
Lack of joint models, no integration of tax cooperation into other solidarity 
agendas, for example CSR and fair trade
Offshore centres considered a problem for tax discrimination in the case of 
profit loss, not because of a lack of solidarity
Human factors Lack of knowledge on the link between taxation and poverty
Lack of culture of working together across policy sectors
No interest in sustainable development / poverty reduction
Lack of vision on other than neo-liberal economic models
Insufficient culture of transparency
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in the responsible business and fair trade agenda, potentially increasing both fair 
pay and revenues for social spending. Taxation could be a powerful way to brand 
companies, and embedding taxation in the CSR principles and branding “corporate 
citizenship” for ethical business practices, and thereby making CSR a “business case” 
(Jenkins & Newell, 2013: 387−388) is a potential way to promote the EU’s responsible 
trade and investment policy “Trade for All” (European Commission, 2015j).
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8. Discussion and Conclusions
Placing the problem of inequality at the heart of the notion of poverty, this dissertation 
has investigated how the EU’s development policy has evolved and interacted in 
a changing global poverty landscape. It has scrutinized the EU’s differentiation 
strategy as part of its development cooperation according to the commitments to 
the achievement of the SDGs. I have attempted to shed light to whether the EU’s 
differentiated approaches to development are coherent with the EU’s objective of 
poverty eradication in its bilateral cooperation. Central has been to examine the EU’s 
policy approaches to poverty and inequality in the light of the priorities set by the 
SDGs, and to compare these approaches to operational methodologies to differentiate 
partnerships allegedly for more fittingly tailored cooperation with the beneficiaries. 
Assuming that policies inform the ways cooperation is organized and carried out, 
the analysis has compared policy definitions and the key political issues related to 
differentiation of the instruments through which such principles are turned into 
practice. As a third element, I have examined, although not in a detailed manner, 
the organizational dynamics that greatly affect the ways the policies are interpreted 
in practice.
When it comes to the criteria for differentiation and what led to the selection 
of countries where the principle would be applied and not to others, my analysis 
points to very ambiguous results. Demonstrating the difficulties of paring such 
principles down to strategic orientations, the criteria were also a source of lengthy 
debates during the MFF 2014-2020 negotiations. Whereas the EU seemed to have a 
reasonably sturdy idea of which countries would be affected by differentiation when 
the MFF negotiations began, it stumbled heavily in explaining why this was the case, 
and in fitting the decision into a strategic framework. It also appeared not to have 
had an explicit strategy outlining what differentiation means, what selection criteria 
it would lay down in the DCI to conceptually establish differentiation for similar 
decisions in the future, and what the specific instruments of differentiation are. 
The EU is notorious for its policy statements that allow multiple interpretations in 
practice, and differentiated (development) cooperation is no exception. It is the same 
ambiguity that has raised questions of the legitimacy of the differentiated approach.
From an operational point of view, while at a certain moment during the MFF 
2014-2020 negotiations the EU seemed to lean towards following the OECD DAC 
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criteria for ODA as a basis for differentiation, the DCI regulation with the Member 
States’ final stamp on it ended up enabling more space for the consideration of 
different development factors than the OECD ODA criteria alone. This is an 
important point although not yet sufficient to explain differentiation: the EU has 
in many aspects followed shared international principles but took its own course in 
outlining eligibility for development cooperation. A second and a more significant 
point to be made has to do with the totality of differentiation. At the time of the MFF 
2014-2020 negotiations the principle was mostly discussed in the context of closing 
development programmes in nineteen countries. Very few other possible strategic 
orientations to differentiation, such as reduced cooperation or innovative mixes of 
development cooperation and private/civil society partnerships, were put on the table. 
These operational alternatives are nevertheless at the heart of global discussions with 
regards to what counts as ODA and how to achieve the SDGs especially in the newer 
MICs that are still at risk of falling back into the LIC category, and in MICs that 
struggle with multiple development challenges despite their impressive GDP/GNI 
growth levels. For the EU, this point was a missed opportunity to develop innovative 
ODA mechanisms with partners from developing and emerging economies. The 
MFF 2021-2027 seems to be an effort to fix some of the problems encountered in 
the current MFF when it comes to financing development and addressing the grey 
areas within MICs. In its initial proposal published in May 2018, the EU dropped 
the language of differentiation that was present in the MFF 2014-2020. Instead, the 
narrative attempts to follow the tone of the SDGs, calling for more synergies between 
programmes in both geographical and thematic objective-setting. With its proposal 
of only one external overarching financial instrument, the new financial architecture 
is considered to be both more “agile” and more “flexible” and so better able to respond 
to global needs arising in the next seven year period. The proposal contains major 
changes to current and past development funding, (changes which could well serve 
the implementation of the SDGs better provided the right strategic choices are made) 
but given that it seems to build on the differentiation principle it therefore poses 
some further risks for regions that are not allegedly among the EU’s priorities.
Latin America and Asia, in the spirit of differentiation in MFF 2014-2020, will 
most probably be more affected in the next budget cycle (see also ECDPM, 2018). 
While the new MFF proposal hardly mentions Latin American or Asian MICs 
anymore, many of the countries discussed here are ex-colonies of the European 
countries, and for example the cooperation with Latin America was significantly 
boosted when Spain and Portugal, significant partners of many Latin American 
countries, joined the EU. Looking at the EU’s development policy changes in the years 
following the introduction of the differentiated approach, the EU has increasingly 
directed its development resources to its neighbourhood. Latin America and Asia 
are perhaps seen as potential grounds for testing innovations and the power of 
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political dialogues, but with no significant interest in financial support from the EU 
side anymore, whereas the EU’s immediate border region currently covered by the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), receives substantial support almost 
regardless of these neighbouring states’ financial status. Also the new MFF proposal 
for 2021-2027 leaves no illusions when it comes to the question of interests, with 
considerable emphasis on the EU’s neighbourhood. Of the sixteen neighbouring 
countries, six are LMICs, seven UMICs, and Israel is a High Income Country (HIC); 
Syria and Palestine are in need of humanitarian aid (The World Bank, 2018). Despite 
their economic statuses, some of these countries also receive funding through DCI. 
However, distribution of scarce development funding is a matter of equity and equality, 
and the EU should be careful – normative actor that it is – not to make decisions 
either on the grounds of colonial heritage or proximity to the EU, but with a view of 
poverty eradication according to the SDGs. On the operational side, differentiation 
seemed to be based on a strong reliance on the advice of the delegations concerned, 
where for instance the knowledge of using the PCD approach for best development 
outcomes have been demonstrably limited. As the analysis has revealed, PCD in 
cooperation in the field has often seemed to be understood as mere rule compliance 
between the EU and the partner.
As has also been discussed, while development cooperation objectives remain 
chiefly targeted at developing countries, the SDGs have blurred the policy boundaries 
between development and other domains, which is why the MICs should not be, ex-
colonies or not, automatically excluded from development cooperation if there is 
the will from the partner’s side to continue. The global discussion on GPGCs has 
been intimately linked to both innovative development financing – public-private 
partnerships − and to the demand to develop national, regional and global tax 
mechanisms to cater for the protection of common goods (Carbone, 2007b). Here 
the EU has been careful to emphasize that the responsibility is shared, and that there 
should not therefore be overly optimistic expectations of development assistance 
from the EU. Turning the same issue the other way round, there have been fewer 
statements on the responsibilities of the European actors and the EU regarding 
the protection of developing economies’ resources and their sustainable use in the 
context of European trade interests.
Global political economy and post-development models 
Collier has fittingly suggested that we tend to identify root causes of poverty 
problems according to our own interests or as he calls them, “hobby horses” (Collier, 
2007:22). This may lead to identification symptoms not being correctly diagnosed, 
and the solving of problems according to our own understanding of the world order 
instead. The EU has been keen on emphasizing that sustainability is not achieved 
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by old means, and that innovative forms of cooperation are needed. In 2016 the 
European Political Strategy Centre called for developing models to “embrace change” 
such as the circular economy, and to promote innovative thinking for new, possibly 
immaterial, growth models that would stop stretching the planetary boundaries and 
creating social de-cohesion, recognizing that such a lack of harmony is unsustainable 
for the future (EPSC, 2016: 5-8).
Turning back to differentiation, it was an instrumental decision and, even if its 
success is debatable, it was an attempt to level partnerships to fit the current world 
order better. As emerging economies have gained more economic power, they have 
also brought more diversity and a different power balance to the international fora. 
Especially in Latin America, a home continent of many rapid GNI growth MICs, 
the MDGs were considered to lack regional relevance and to focus too narrowly 
on economic growth (ECLAC, 2012: 72). Even if the SDGs are considered to be a 
more inclusive set of goals in that they enable considerations of local priorities and 
alternative means of addressing them, Latin America, where equality and equity, 
particularly of rural populations, indigenous people, women and youth, are major 
poverty concerns, continues to be critical to poverty eradication agendas that are 
products of the globally dominant liberal economic tenets. There is a growing 
body of academic literature of “alternatives to development” – a concept originally 
launched by a renowned South American scholar, A. Escobar (1995). Whereas the 
alternative theories, whether originating in South America, Africa or elsewhere, 
present a diversified range of ideas, they are generally critical towards growth models 
and the existing development machinery, and above all; Eurocentrism. To name a 
couple as examples, the Latin American born neo-extractivism project takes a critical 
approach to extractivist development paths by for instance suggesting more national 
control over resources (Burchardt & Dietz, 2014). The Australian academics Gibson-
Graham with their long-term work on post-capitalist theory take a significantly 
more radical approach by promoting discursive change in the form of “collective dis-
identification with capitalism” (Gibson-Graham, 2006: 56-7).
There is very little, if any, economic sociological research to connect to these 
alternative models. Some research has been carried out regarding how third world 
countries’ development strategies are embedded in the ways industries are organized 
on the one hand, and the ways grassroots social movements shape such an order on 
the other (Gereffi, 2005). Gereffi, by emphasizing the role of multi- or transnational 
corporations in global economic integration, discusses “immiserizing growth” that 
refers to growth in terms of economic activity and employment, but accompanied 
by a decline in terms of economic returns in developing countries (Ibid.: 164). These 
types of analyses link directly to the criticism of global capitalism evolving in, from 
our Western viewpoint, the peripheries of the world.
65
The EU’s Differentiated Development Cooperation and the New Global Challenges / 
Discussion and Conclusions
For the EU, free trade agreements have been one of the most commonly used 
tools to form partnerships with third countries, both out of self-centred interests 
and for the ideological belief that the integration of developing countries into the 
West-centred world economy is the answer to poverty eradication. Despite a few 
recent policy statements on the need for a change that embraces environmental and 
developmental sustainability, there is little evidence that alternatives to the dominant 
development discourses based on liberal economies would make a significant 
difference to the objectives of the cooperation between the EU and its MIC partners 
using the currently available operational instruments discussed in this analysis. What 
are perceived as “innovations” in the EU – or in the Western world at large, have been 
products of the prevailing system, for example in the field of taxation, discussed at 
length in this dissertation. It is likely that tax cooperation will be deepened, which may 
enable, for example, experiments on universal basic income systems as mechanisms 
to achieve more equal revenue distribution.
Limitations of the study and future research
Taking a sociological stance on the research problem has been a deliberate choice 
but by no means the only existing possibility. EU research, including similar analyses 
to the one at hand, tends to be anchored in political or political economic science, 
but with over 30,000 employees and far more officials closely connected to it in 
the Member States, the EU is as much a social as it is a political entity. It is thus 
also an arena in which groups are formed according to their interests and motives. 
Understanding the social construct of the EU would also deepen the understanding 
of why and how the EU forms its policies, and how it relates to the rest of the world.
Social aspects of the functions of the EU are still under-studied, which poses 
a risk to the carrying out of a credible multi-disciplinary analysis such as this one. 
One difficulty of making such an investigation is the lack of comparative research, 
and therefore, at times, of finding an intellectual home for it, but keeping the 
theoretical focus solely on social sciences would have also resulted in a truncated and 
therefore flawed analysis especially with a novel, complex operative principle such 
as differentiation. Despite these concerns, the increased complexity of our societies 
must be reflected in academic work as well, and one should not shy away from the 
challenge of multi-disciplinary research. Even if the research problem is chiefly 
tackled from a social point of view, the vast amount of political and development 
studies of the EU that already exist, and which I have combined here fairly liberally, 
have provided the necessary broader contextual framework to the topic.
Parts that focus on organizational development and taxation have drawn from 
both classic and contemporary economic sociology. Parts that centre on poverty 
reduction and development have been based on economic theories and development 
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studies, which itself is a multi-disciplinary field. Parts that focus on qualitative 
aspects of a good life, equality and equity, and the power relations within a society 
have benefited from both economic research and cultural anthropology. Conceptual 
deliberations have been drawn in equal parts from political economy and social 
studies.
The study has chiefly focused on analysing the operational approaches to 
differentiation in the past few years, and on searching for the existing definitions 
of differentiation in the mainstream framework of thought on development. The 
researchers have relatively recently started to pay attention to the interrelations or 
causalities of economic inequality (income disparities) and inequality in human 
capabilities and individual or collective, relative and absolute opportunities. There 
is plenty of room for more such studies, especially in societies with increasing 
inequalities, and in countries with heterogenic ethnic and social groups. Another, so 
far relatively unexplored, field is the impact of external factors, especially the impact 
of donor policies and practices beyond development cooperation on in-country 
inequalities experienced by the beneficiaries. A better understanding of inequality, 
including knowledge inequality, and the dominance of US and Europe-based social 
research that produces and reinforces dominant discourses (Connell, 2016) can 
potentially increase both human and ecological equity and equality. As for economic 
sociology in particular and as a distinctive element, it is attentive to the notions of 
agency and power, the relations between states and firms, and the ways markets 
are born, stabilized and changed through interactions between different agents. As 
Fligstein and Dauter posit, “Perhaps the most promising aspect of the sociology of 
markets is the potential to theorize as well as empirically examine the connections 
between intra-organizational dynamics and inter-organizational competition and 
exchange” (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007: 117). These types of analyses will be crucial 
to understanding changing global relations, whether between states, international 
organizations or the private sector.
Lastly, and for the same reason, strengthening future research collaboration 
between the traditional North and the South is essential. Combining Southern 
perspectives and existing inequality research would enable the development of 
genuinely tailored − instead of one-size-fits-all – cooperation approaches that assume 
that a comparative advantage in global economic growth is the ideal “development”. 
When it comes to criticism emanating from the global South, we should refrain from 
looking at the SDGs as a mere product of the Western development machinery, but 
rather, with their wide scope, use them to serve different world views, polities and 
cultural values for the best societal outcomes. 
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Research recommendations for the future
Research evidence is still ambivalent as to whether inequality is on the rise 
or decreasing (Ravaillon 2018). However, what can be safely stated is that a 
considerable gap between rich and poor exists in different parts of the world and 
that state borders fail to mark those gaps. Evidence also suggests that inequalities 
seem to have progressed as the share of financial markets (as opposed to capital 
accumulation through manufacturing) has increased (Bourgoignon, 2015: 57). 
Most parts of the world have grown more concerned about sustainability, but we 
have also become more wary of the difficulty of achieving it, facing the paradox 
of being more joined to each other than ever before – thanks to different aspects 
of globalization − and at the same time more in need of diverse solutions for the 
achievement of what is perceived as a good quality of life than ever before. Some 
instrumental and strategic recommendations as to how differentiation could be 
conceptualized and made to serve as a tool for planning more inclusive cooperation 
arise from the analysis:
	 Inequalities are difficult to define and quantify, and therefore care should 
be taken as to how inequality data is used for policy making and public 
awareness raising. Much of the available data focuses on income inequality, 
which is by and large based on income data or consumer prices of baskets of 
goods (Ravaillon, 2018). Apart from the inadequacy of income as a measure 
of societal inequalities, an additional weakness lies partly in the failure to 
take into account alternative forms of consumption, social structures and 
livelihoods, and partly in the idea that across the world people’s perceptions of 
a good life are satisfied by similar sets of goods according to similar lifestyles. 
Data-gathering models that also consider subjective experiences of happiness 
and lifestyles more holistically and throughout life cycles would help to 
establish baselines to reflect more accurately the situation in a given context 
and thereby to achieve real structural changes in the long term. Examples 
could be sought from different models of barter economy, whether rooted in 
indigenous cultures or born in Western societies in search of alternatives for 
consumerism. In the same vein identification of unjust systems or practices 
that may create inequalities between different social or age groups, or even 
between household members seems to be necessary.
	 The current economic system does not seem to cater to the achievement of 
equity, and the development of mechanisms for controlling financial markets 
and re-distribution that touch the richest of the societies on a global scale 
appears no less than essential. According to Alvaredo et al., (2018) the EU is a 
model region, with its potential to curb increases in income inequality with, for 
example, progressive taxation. However, as the analysis has shown, there are also 
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EU countries whose policies have favoured attracting investment and wealth 
(with low corporate taxes), which has led to – through multi-faceted paths – 
to decreased net incomes of individuals and increasing in-country inequalities 
(Bourgoignon, 2015). From the sustainability point of view one may ask why 
corporate taxes seem to governments and policy makers to be untouchable, and 
why controlling financial markets combined with developing equivalent global 
re-distributive systems to poorer populations and to the protection of global 
public goods appears logical for the achievement of the SDG.
	 Differentiation as a methodology seems artificial if inequalities are not 
considered as part of the poverty problem in a more strategic way. Identification 
of inequalities and the causes of them can point effectively to the root causes 
of poverty, provided that donors adopt inter-disciplinary definitions of 
inequalities. In more operational terms, tackling inequalities by lifting people 
out of, or preventing them from falling into, poverty combined with a systems 
approach to changing oppressive structures would as a tactic, in all likelihood, 
lead to improved lives for the poorest in the long-term. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, evidence also suggests that focusing on inequality in poverty reduction 
will entail a discussion around financial and qualitative trade-offs instead of 
unlimited growth.
	 As for utilizing differentiation as a functional tool, adapting the idea of Yamey 
et al. (2016), a differentiated operational approach for sustainable development 
should entail twin-strategy models for development planning that distinguish 
between, but also recognize causalities between, global, regional and local 
actions. A prerequisite however is to come up with sharp enough definitions of 
global public goods in order to enable effective provision and protection of them 
by means of cross-border collaboration. This approach should be accompanied 
by the positive integration of the EU into global systems (such as supply chains) 
with the necessary self-regulation of elements that have repercussions on third 
countries, whether financial, environmental or social. Local actions should be 
planned both in dialogue with global actions and with consideration given to 
local specificities in living and environmental conditions.
	 The core idea of development cooperation is to make it redundant within 
an appropriate time frame. Despite this logic, very few donors consider exit 
strategies at the onset of their cooperation in third countries. To state the 
obvious, they should exist. But they should also be beneficiary-driven and free 
from donor interests. They should be based on consultative, evidence-based 
development projections that differentiate 1) systems/structural, 2) time-bound 
as opposed to persistent; and 3) socio-cultural development challenges from 
each other, as well as feasible hand-over strategies.
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Figure 2: Differentiated intervention logic
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Conclusions
New alternative models for sustainable life that tackle the problems that inequalities 
create already exist outside the EU, but despite the recognition of the problems (and 
in some cases possible solutions) the EU’s policies are by and large still ill-prepared 
to deal with complex development challenges outside the EU’s own socio-political, 
economic and administrative culture. However, this is only one part of the story, 
while another one is the political priorities of the institution.
I have attempted to make a point of portraying the EU as a responsible actor, 
and a donor of a significant share of the world’s ODA. As such, it has a great say in 
global development politics. Indeed, it has been one of the key players in the creation 
of the SDGs with uncompromised policy to promote rights and equality, rigorous 
environmental policies based on research, and a strong discourse for sustainability. 
Nevertheless, at the operational level it seems not to really initiate any change for 
sustainability and stability – at least not at the cost of its economic opportunities. 
The EU also has a reputation as a global promoter of democracy and peace, and 
has emphasized for example the building of resilience among vulnerable states and 
communities, yet it does not have a particular capability to deal with the risks of 
rising economic or social inequalities and polarization. It has also a strong political 
commitment to policy coherence for development, but as numerous researchers 
have stated, it does not have the tools (or the will) to operationalize PCD effectively. 
By the same token, the EU is also a promoter of change and innovation, yet it 
seems not particularly flexible when it comes to different knowledge systems for 
ideological changes, or for considering local social or economic specificities among 
its partners. As I have discussed in chapter three, the EU has many definitions: EU 
the responsible actor, Fortress EU and so forth. This analysis concludes that the EU 
is also an encoded EU: despite being attentive to new global challenges, it is a sort 
of machinery that creates apparent challenges to change; in this case in a situation 
where conceivable divergence between policy and operations is detected. This has 
been visible in the operationalization of differentiation, which was seemingly done 
on the EU’s institutional terms and within the limits of its operational scope, even if 
development policies would have supported other, perhaps more suitable, strategies 
for the partners. Indeed, the EU’s broad foreign policy scope would have also 
enabled an approach to differentiation that would be attentive to global development 
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challenges and their equivalent repercussions at the local level. A prerequisite of 
taking such elements into account would have been to carry out thorough assessments 
of the explicit local socio-economic and environmental conditions, governance and 
political drivers, as well as the partners’ own views on the circumstances. Thorough 
knowledge of such elements would then have helped in drawing up forecasts for the 
potential termination of development cooperation, and for exit strategies that could 
outline corresponding and, appropriate operational solutions.
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Appendix 2. Key Concepts
Blending Or grants-loans blending, an aid modality with which the Commission 
pursues innovative financing mechanisms for development according to the global 
Agenda for Financing Development (2015). Typically the Commission combines 
grants from its development funding budget and loans from European finance 
institutions, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) for leveraging effect. The 
Commission’s grants are used for, for example, interest rate subsidies, technical 
assistance or guarantees to reduce financial risk for the partner. Blending is most 
commonly utilized in capital-intensive energy and infrastructure initiatives.
Budget support A development assistance modality that includes direct transfers of 
funding to the treasury of the partner country. Budget support can be either sectoral 
or general. Aligned with the Agenda for Change, the general objectives of budget 
support are poverty reduction, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and the 
consolidation of democracies. Eligibility for budget support from the European 
Commission is conditional; it is based on general conditions related to the existence 
of credible (to the donor) national development strategies, macro-economic 
policies, public financial management systems and transparent budget management. 
Also context-specific “special conditions” are used. These are agreed upon by the 
European Commission and the beneficiary. In 2016, budget support disbursements 
of the Commission amounted to 1.73 billion Euros, which is equivalent to 18 per 
cent of the annual development assistance of the institution (https://ec.europa.eu/
europeaid/node/13967)
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Dating back to the early 1960’s and reflecting 
the economic importance of the agriculture sector in the EU, the CAP is among the 
oldest joint policies in the EU. Even if the CAP has been reformed several times in the 
past decades, the importance of it has not changed. Support to agriculture still forms 
the largest single expenditure in the joint EU budget. Governed by four regulations, 
the CAP entails 1) direct payments to support environmentally friendly agriculture; 
2) regulating agricultural markets, 3) rural development, and 4) horizontal issues 
for CAP expenditure and compliance mechanisms (https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-
farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy/cap-glance_en). In 
the context of poverty eradication, the EU has been criticized for distorting world 
markets with its CAP and for regulations that lead to preferential treatment of 
European products at the expense of developing economies.
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) A proposal which the 
Commission has put forward to the Member States to pursue fairer and more efficient 
taxation with less administrative burden for the EU. In connection with the Single 
Market, it would form a set of rules for cross-border companies operating in the EU. 
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With CCCTB in place, the European Commission’s vision entails reporting taxable 
income to an EU-wide system, which the Commission would coordinate, instead of 
reporting to each Member State where the companies operate. The Commission first 
proposed CCCTB in 2011. After lack of support from the Member States, it withdrew 
the proposal, but re-introduced the idea as part of the Post-2020 MFF proposal in 
2018.
EU development policy Development policy is a shared competence of the Union. 
The “European Consensus for Development”, adopted in 2005, was the first joint 
policy to express a comprehensive EU-wide vision of development with an objective 
of poverty eradication. It was aligned with the Millennium Development Goals, 
and emphasized sustainable development as the means for the achievement of the 
Goals. In 2011, it was followed by the “Agenda for Change”, which renewed the 
commitment to poverty eradication, but which updated the EU vision of it, laying its 
main emphasis on sustainable growth. As a third phase, aligned with the Sustainable 
Development Goals that came into force in 2015, the EU has again updated these 
previous policies with its “New European Consensus on Development” of 2017. 
The policies are not legally binding, but they outline the principles, the modes and the 
modalities, and the thematic areas of development cooperation, which all members 
aim to adhere to.
European Council Led by the Council President, it consists of the Heads of State 
or Heads of Government of the EU Member States. The Council holds the ultimate 
power in the EU, and decides on the EU’s political direction as well as the priorities 
of the Union.
European Commission Executive institution of the European Union. Led by its 
President, its main tasks include proposing common policies and legislation, and 
implementing the EU’s policies. It functions on a commonly agreed budget with 
member state contributions, and it employs some 32,000 staff members, of which 
approximately 65 per cent work in its headquarters in Brussels, and the rest within 
EU Member States and the roughly 140 EU delegations around the world (Source: 
European Commission 2018, HR Key Figures).
European Parliament With 751 representatives (pre-brexit situation) from the 
Member States and led by its President, the Parliament provides guidance and 
monitors the work of the Commission. It participates in political debates in the Union 
and together with the Council and the Commission it sets the political priorities 
of the EU. It has gained significant decision-making powers in the Union with the 
changes in the EU Treaties; for example the MFF must be agreed on unanimously 
with the consent of the Parliament.
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Financial instrument The Headings of the MFF are divided into numerous thematic 
financial instruments, through which funds are disbursed for the execution of the EU’s 
strategic objectives. This research has discussed two specific financial instruments 
under Heading 4: the Development Cooperation Instrument and the Partnership 
Instrument. There are also a number of instruments outside of the MFF that are based 
on various specific agreements. Such instruments include the European Development 
Fund (EDF), the Emergency Aid Reserve, the European Globalization Adjustment 
Fund, the European Union Solidarity Fund and the Flexibility Instrument.
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014-2020 The EU’s institutional budget 
running on a seven year cycle to translate the EU’s political priorities into financial 
terms. It is negotiated between, and agreed upon, by the European Commission, the 
European Council and the European Parliament. The MFF 2014-2020 established 
maximum ceilings under 5 Headings with their sub-headings: 1) Smart and Inclusive 
Growth (47%); 2) Sustainable Growth: natural resources (38.9%); 3) Security and 
Citizenship (1.6%); 4) Global Europe (6.1%); and 5) Administration (6.4%). Heading 
1 includes cohesion funds, of which the largest beneficiary is the group of Eastern 
European member states. Heading 2 includes financing CAP, one of the major 
policy priorities of the Union. Financing European Commission cooperation with 
third countries has been included under Heading 4. To the Post-2020 MFF, the 
Commission has proposed significant structural changes, which, if agreed upon, will 
bring changes to the headings.
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Established in the 1960’s, 
the Committee includes 30 member states from Europe, Asia and North America. 
The European Union is also a DAC member while the World Bank, the IMF and 
UNDP participate as observers. The Committee gives recommendations and policy 
guidance for the formulation of national development policies, and as such it has a 
major influence on the ways development cooperation is understood and carried out 
worldwide. The Committee carries out peer reviews among its Members regularly.
Official Development Assistance (ODA) Defined by the OECD as “i. Provided 
by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive 
agencies; and ii. Each transaction, which: a) is administered with the promotion of 
the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; 
and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per 
cent, calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent, (www.oecd.org)”. Eligibility for 
ODA is set in OECD DAC List of ODA Recipients, based on the per capita GNI 
division between Least Developed Countries, Other Low Income Countries, Lower 
Middle Income Countries and Territories, and Upper Middle Income Countries 
and Territories. The list is reviewed on an annual basis. The OECD members have 
reaffirmed the commitment to the 0.7 per cent allocation of the GNI to ODA, first 
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introduced in the 1950s, although only five countries in the world have reached 
this target: Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. 
Together the EU member states and the EU institutional ODA represents the largest 
share, over 55 per cent of the global ODA (Statistics OECD, 2015).
Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) With a growing realization of the 
need for more synergies between development and other policy domains in the 
increasingly complex and inter-linked world, the concept was first developed by the 
OECD in the 1990s. At minimum, PCD has been defined as a “do no harm principle” 
according to which other policy domains should not contradict or endanger 
development objectives. More ambitiously and nowadays more popularly, donors 
aim to achieve the more ambitious goal of creating positive spillovers into trade and 
other policy fields for poverty reduction with PCD approach. The Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) iterates the importance of a PCD approach to the EU, for which PCD entails 
the so-called 3Cs: complementarity, coordination and coherence (Holland, 2002). 
The EU is considered to be a champion of the PCD approach, although applying a 
PCD approach in practice has been recognized as a challenge. The 2005 European 
Consensus for Development was the first important policy affirmation outlining the 
commitments and the mechanisms of the EU to be applied to the PCD concept.
Rights-based approach An operational approach that takes into account human 
rights standards in all cooperation between partners. It entails compliance with 
human rights treaties, promoting of non-discriminatory practices, and provides 
lenses through which to analyse any unjust distributions of power that hinder 
progress towards common goals, such as development objectives. It distinguishes 
rights holders and duty bearers, and calls for accountability of the latter. (Source: 
www.hrbaportal.org). The EU defines democracy, the rule of law, indivisibility of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law as 
its universal values, values which guide rights-based approaches in all EU action.
Single Market Still considered as one of the EU’s main achievements, the Single 
Market was developed in the 1990’s and entails free movement of people, goods, 
capital and services and the elimination of tariffs, quotas and taxes on trade within the 
EU area. In addition to forming a free trade area internally, it comprises significant 
share of world trade. Together with China and the US, the EU’s single market area is 
among the world’s largest traders with a share of over 15 per cent of world exports in 
2016 (Source: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do). 
In its partnerships with third countries the EU exercises power in trade (exchanging 
goods, capital and services) and power through trade (exporting EU norms and 
standards) (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006: 910).
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Sustainable Development Goals Coming into force in 2015 as a result of several 
years’ intensive work by states, international organisations and civil society, the 
17 Goals, 169 targets and 230 indicators set a global agenda for poverty reduction 
and sustainable development. Also referred to as the Agenda 2030, the Goals are 
considered to be the most ambitious and inclusive sustainable development agenda 
in the arena of international cooperation so far. The EU, which was an active partner 
in the drafting process, has stressed joint responsibility beyond development 
cooperation for the achievement of the goals and encompasses a broad approach to 
the implementation of them; through policy coherence, with innovative sources of 
funding and with a broad range of public, private and civil society actors. The EU’s 
own development policies are aligned with the SDGs.
Tax Good Governance Policy orientation, which the European Commission pursues 
both in its internal affairs and external relations. Aligned with international tax 
commitments such as the OECD/BEPS, it entails promoting tax transparency, fair 
tax competition and paying taxes where profit has been made. The Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) has agreed in its conclusions of May 2008 that 
tax good governance should be incorporated into all relevant bilateral and regional 
agreements between the EU and third countries. Applying the principle in practice 
has met with varied success, facing resistance from some countries. (Source: COM 
(2016) 24, 28 January)
Treaty of Lisbon A reform treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty establishing the European Community, which came into force on 1st December 
2009. It changed the way the Union exercises power, the decision-making processes 
and the consequent institutional set up. As a novelty, it outlined three different EU 
competences: exclusive competence, where the Union alone can legislate whereas 
the role of the Member States is to implement the legislation; shared competence, 
where the Member States can legislate when joint Union legislation does not exist; 
and supporting competence, where the EU supports and adopts Member States’ 
legislation. Development policy is a shared competence of the Union. The Treaty 
of Lisbon also strengthened the Union’s legal commitments to protect fundamental 
rights, by making the Charter of Fundamental Rights a legally binding document. 
The Treaty also enables EU accession to international treaties.
Washington Consensus An agenda that was originally created by the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the US in the 1980’s. It consisted of a set of economic 
reforms to be promoted in developing countries. The Washington Consensus has 
been considered as a deeply neoliberal agenda with the idea that markets are efficient 
whereas states are inefficient. The Consensus aggressively promoted free markets, 
privatization, flexible labour policies and monetary policies over fiscal policies with 
the assumption that economic growth will automatically benefit the poor as well. 
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By the same token, the Consensus has unconditionally promoted globalization and 
capital mobility with the idea that individual countries profit from international free 
trade. After much criticism in academia and from social movements in the 1980’s 
and early 1990’s, the World Bank gradually shifted towards the Post-Washington 
Consensus in the late 1990’s. The Post-Washington Consensus was more attentive 
to the social aspects of development, specifically education, social protection and 
efforts targeted on poverty reduction. While it did not reject most of the neo-liberal 
ideas of the markets, it put additional emphasis on institution-building and the state’s 
role in regulating markets for economic growth and putting in place social policies 
for poverty reduction. Today the weakness of both agendas is considered to be the 
striking lack of any promotion of re-distributive fiscal policies, which has resulted in 
deep global wealth inequality over the past decades. (Saad-Filho, 2010).
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Appendix 3. List of interview questions
General information
• Position of the interviewee and their main area of work 
• The unit’s overall strategic and operative focus as related to sustainable 
development 
Questions on tax good governance for horizontal units:
• How do you see the relevance of tax good governance / corporate social 
responsibility initiatives in your unit’s work?
• What is your opinion of the usefulness or practical implications of tax good 
governance initiatives such as the work of Platform for Tax Good Governance 
in your area of work?
• Specifically in the context of your unit’s work, is tax good governance taken 
into account in the partnerships?
• If you answered yes to the previous question, in what ways does tax (good) 
governance work in practice, what is the division of labour between your unit 
and the other internal interlocutors? What means are used for coordination and 
coherence between different interlocutors?
• Why do you think there is, or is not, a need for tax good governance initiatives?
• Are there specific factors (and what are they) that explain why tax good 
governance principles are a challenge to operationalize?
• Have there been (and if so what kind of) links to the Commission’s corporate 
social responsibility and tax good governance agendas?
• Can you provide concrete examples of initiatives on tax good governance 
or corporate social responsibility that contribute to tax good governance and 
fairer resource distribution related to your area of work (e.g. such as specific 
clauses in trade agreements)?
Questions limited to certain geographic units:
• Specifically in the context of ACP, is tax good governance taken into account 
in the partnerships with them?
• If you answered yes to the previous question, in what ways does good tax 
governance work in practice, what is the division of labour in the Commission 
(from your point of view?) and what means have been utilized to ensure 
coordination and coherence between other interlocutors?
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Specific additional questions for units involved in developing tax good 
governance initiatives
• Background: what were the factors that made the Commission focus 
specifically on tax initiatives (in internal and external policies) and establish a 
platform?
• What is the division of labour in terms of the commitments of different actors 
and how does the Platform function in practice?
• What are the Commission’s role and competences with regards to the work of 
the Platform, and which are the current main initiatives and focus areas?
• How do the objectives of the platform feature in the Commission’s partnerships 
with third countries? Are there specific target countries or regions and if so, 
for what reason?
• What is the relevance of corporate social responsibility initiatives in tax 
initiatives? How does the Platform link to them?
• What tools exist for a fairer distribution of income in third countries within the 
single market framework?
• Where is the Commission at with regards to the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)?
• What has been the impact of the list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions on 
existing partnerships or on forming new partnerships?
• What were/are the challenges between the Member States and the institution 
with regards to publishing of such a list?
• Are there specific factors (and what are they) as to why tax good governance 
principles are a challenge to operationalize?
• Can you provide concrete examples of initiatives on tax good governance (or 
corporate social responsibility) that contribute to tax good governance and 
fairer resource distribution related to your area of work (e.g. such as specific 
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